5 comments about The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth.

1. Barry Naughton has written a masterful book. It is comprehensive, accessible and rigorous. Researchers, upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, who want to understand the key economic issues faced by China, will all appreciate this volumn. I am using it in my Master courses!
   
   Jiin-ming Fahn, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan



2. A superb guide to the intricacies of the Chinese economy. I highly recommend it to students, professionals, policy makers, and academics looking to better understand the underlying themes and trends of the world's fastest growing economy.
   
   Erik Lundh,
   Washington, DC



3. An excellent book which is rare for being highly readable, insightful, and well supported. Those who know China will find specific information and analysis which explains why the country operates in the way that it does. Those who don't know China will learn about the country without the confusion that results from the writings of casual observers.
   
   The only specific weakness in the book is Dr. Naughton's assessment of modern industrial policy, which is incomplete and off-track. That aspect is simply an omission and does little to detract from the overall value of his work.



4. China's economic development since 1978 has baffled and surprised the world. Other developing economies may regard China with envy but if they are contemplating copying China's model of development, help is at hand. They just need to read Naughton's book.
   
   China's three decade of economic development has been called many things, such as groping stones while crossing the river, three steps forward and two back, bird cage economics, transition from command to market, amazing, miraculous and more. The author has organized the historical date in a way easy to comprehend and coupled with explanations that are lucid and easy to follow.
   
   Textbook conjures up the image of a big snore, but not this one. This one will become essential reference book dogeared by frequent use.



5. Having read countless articles and books on China, Naughton stands out as the leader on the Chinese economy. This book is structured brilliantly, providing novices and experts alike with easy access to valuable information.
   
   I recommend this to anyone with any interest in understanding how China has grown into a leader in today's economy.

5 comments about The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade.

1. The book is a good read, since I am taking my international trade class, this is actually one of the require reading. If someone who is very liberal, or cuddle to grave type of mentality, this book does not offer the cuddly senstivitive that the faint hearted people are looking for. But it is quite realistic. If you can look pass the sweatshops and all, this is a good read.



2. Worst of both worlds - claims to be anecdotal to get around having to have too much actual information (other than the more boring parts of the history of the American textile industry, but trades in interesting anecdotes for general suppositions and a couple sucess stories.
   The last section is very cool and interesting and saves this book from the bin. If you get it, skip to the end.



3. Allow me to provide a more descriptive title for this volume: What I did last summer + a history of cotton growing in America + a history of cotton mills around the world + a brief history of Shanghai + a brief history of child labor + a brief history of labor activism + a brief history of workplace safety regulations + a not-at-all-brief history of US textile protectionism + a characterization of the international market for used clothes. Interesting? Often.
   
   In the course of all these histories - occasionally interspersed with a reminder that we are following Rivoli's t-shirt around the world - we jump from England to Japan to Texas to West Africa; we leap back and forth (and back and forth) from century to century. By the middle of the book, I had gotten dizzy and wished it had been a long magazine article.
   
   But in fact, the second half is the most interesting. Rivoli gives a detailed history of textile protectionism in the United States, giving a peek into the dizzying, constantly morphing tariff and quota systems as well as the huge bureaucracy the system supports. And finally, she gives an illuminating description of what happens to the t-shirts after they get donated to the Salvation Army and how they make it to market stalls in East Africa.
   
   Rivoli is an economist and so recognizes that her inherent leaning is toward free trade, but she argues for the value of both sides of the textile battle, both the free traders and the student demonstrators.
   
   The first half of the book feels too long (even though it isn't that long), and Rivoli's strength is in illuminating description rather than careful analysis. But if you get bored, just skip ahead to the next chapter: There's plenty to choose from!
   
   [I listened to the unabridged audiobook narrated by Eliza Foss, published by Recorded Books. The reading is fine, but Foss's voice is too syrupy sweet and storybookish for 8 CDs (think the voice-over narration from Desperate Housewives).]



4. This is easy to read and understand, written in an engaging and conversational style, with some important insights into the mysteries of crop subsidies, textile quotas and the fate of donated clothing. It's a great illustration and analysis of globalization in action.



5. Upon first glance, it might appear that this book details economic aspects of a
   single industry, namely that of T-shirts. You'd be mistaken. It instead offers
   an insightful look into several different aspects of T-shirt production,
   including agriculture, factory working conditions, free trade (and
   lack thereof), and concluding with the world-wide used T-shirt market. Each of
   these sections could merit a book topic in its own right, but Ms. Rivoli has
   wonderfully combined them into a single book ripe for reading.
   
   Learn about the history of cotton production, including the rise of American
   production and why it's still on top. (Hint: the American government has more
   than a small role, but farm subsidies aren't the major reason.) Learn about the
   back-room political dealings that ensure that some of your clothes come from
   Bangladesh and Mexico instead of China, even though China could provide them for
   less (and why it might be a good idea to keep things that way). Learn about what
   happens to a used T-shirt once it's donated to the Salvation Army, and how it
   might end up being sold in a Kenyan's clothing stall instead of your local
   thrift store.
   
   There is not a dull moment to be found in the book, and in fact seems to get
   more interesting as the book wears on. If there is any fault with the book, it
   is that the book was published in 2005 which means that the revised textile
   trade agreements from 2006 have been left out. A revised edition would be
   appreciated. Luckily, that's the only fault I have with the book. Highly
   recommended.

5 comments about The Commanding Heights : The Battle for the World Economy.

1. This book was rather fun to read but I am not convinced that the authors have as deep an understanding of the phenomena they are writing about as they would like the readers to believe. The book reads like a narrative, full of assertions that are not backed by rigorous analysis of hard evidence. The authors do not critically explore causal relationships, nor do they talk about research that has done so. They present only one particular perspective on the unfolding of events, and they do not defend this perspective against potential criticism.
   
   My experience with economics has always reinforced the idea that causality can be difficult to establish, and can often operate in unexpected ways. An economist must proceed skeptically, being careful to explore alternative explanations and being prepared to defend assertions with theory and data. The authors do not seem to share this view, taking instead a more naive approach.
   
   Maybe I was expecting too much; after all this book is meant to be accessible to non-economists. However, making a book more accessible does not necessitate a lack of rigour or the absence of critical thought; the authors could have removed some of the redundancy in the book (their writing is far from concise!) and replaced it with explorations of alternative perspectives. The book would be greatly enriched by adding more discussion of research that supports (or opposes) their views.



2. That's the central message of this book. But to know why it happened, how it happened, and the geographic extent of this outcome, you need to read this fascinating book.
   
   Now if we can just get our own federal government to realize this . . .
   
   Also read what could be a good companion book: The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else



3. &Both the book DVD are excellent. It is one thing to have lived through global change, it is another thing to understand the interconnections and long-term effects. The focus in several countries is a centrally planned or market-driven economy. Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, China and the United Kingdom are examined in detail for their success and failure. The Soviet Union - Russia, tried to retain dictatorial control and continues to have problems. The "Chicago School of Economics" celebrates its wisdom, models and planning in country after country. However, in every country and economics system, the sustainable natural resource base is overlooked. Keynes may be the "father" of market economics, but Keynes is a short-term perspective. We are approaching Peak Oil and Peak Water and 6.6+ billion people all striving for a USA standard of living. The USA standard of living is based on cheap oil and cheap water and we are entering the "Crude Awakening."
   
   Commanding Heights is an appropriate title, reinforced by knowledgeable people from Harvard, Washington DC and around the world. Commanding heights are about to come tumbling down in country after country as human population exceeds carrying capacity and countries compete for resources and food. The authors did an excellent job, but need to follow-up in light of resource, water and food limits.



4. If you want to understand globalization, this book is required reading. This book provides a full overview and history of 20th century globalization. It discusses the economic choices that third-world countries were making in order to become integrated into the first and second-world international trade system. It discusses the international financial institutions, the newly industrializing economies, market economic policies vs. state controlled economies, trade liberalization, trade policy decisions, and global economics and trade. I found this book to be much better than Thomas Friedman's The Lexis and the Olive Tree (which was also excellent). Although, I would also recommend that students of globalization should also read The Lexis and the Olive Tree and all of Thomas L. Friedman's books.
   
   There was a PBS series of the same name (Commanding Heights) that was based on this book. The PBS series is good, but it is not as good as the book. If you like The Commanding Heights book, you will also like Daniel Yergin's previous book called The Prize which is a history of the oil industry. The Prize is also excellent. It is the definitive history of the oil industry. In fact, I believe it is better than Command Heights. Although both books are excellent. The PBS series or special on the oil industry which was based on the book The Prize was excellent, but again it was not as good as the book.



5. A book from Dr. L's class that help to shape my belief in freedom in the marketplace. A very good historical overview of the economics of the middle and late 20th Century. There are wonderful historical explanations of the rise of socialism in the west and communism in the east as well as the two grand economic schools in the west which were the products of Keynes and Hayek.

2 comments about One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.

1. I might not agree with significant parts of the book, but it is interesting and, as is true with Rodrick's work generally, it makes one think. I suppose that the most problems that I had were with Chapter 4 on industrial policy. Take the issue of Coordination Externalities. There are large areas of the US market economy where these activities have been coordinated without government involvement (e.g., gasoline stations and cars, bee hives and farms or groves, the development of private highways during the first century and a half or so of US history, radio and television (coordinating stations and people who can listen to them), coordinating telephone exchanges, etc). Often government intervention has slowed or harmed that coordination. Do I agree that in theory that greenhouses and electrical grids go hand in hand? Sure. But it is not clear to me why the problem isn't that in some places the government is the one making these decisions. To me that would have been the hard question to answer. Anyway, I found the book interesting.



2. This is a terrific book. It begins with a good and troubling question: If economists are so smart, why have the most prominent success stories in economic development in recent decades been in countries (China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) that ignored our advice? Rodrik's answer is that the advice - mainly Washington Consensus and then its follow-ons - was not so much wrong as a) premature and b) insufficiently flexible. His analysis of recent experience suggests that there are many ways to get growth started in a stagnant economy, and that it takes a very specific, informed, and open-minded local analysis - what he terms "growth diagnostics" - to determine what exactly are the binding constraints in each setting. Furthermore, policies that address those constraints must be politically viable, and that may mean tailoring them so that they create better incentives at the margin without destroying or transferring existing rents.
   
   Once economic growth has started, THEN some of the more standard policy prescriptions, introduced carefully and gradually, may be appropriate and even necessary in order to make growth sustainable. Thus, for example, Rodrik argues that both China and India are moving now in more orthodox policy directions, and appropriately so, but that both relied on quite unorthodox measures to make their initial way out of stagnation.
   
   There are many other issues addressed, including the importance of political arrangements that allow local needs and preferences to be expressed and the case for international trade policies that allow for diversity in national institutional arrangements. The book closes with a detailed and (to me) quite persuasive critique of the focus of the WTO on increasing trade for the sake of trade rather than considering more carefully which changes in trade policy actually make a difference in the lives of the world's poor. His analysis of the Doha Round suggests that, contrary to the received wisdom, a general worldwide liberalization of agricultural markets and removal of developed country subsidies would lead to only small reductions in poverty, and in fact would likely harm many poor consumers in many countries.
   
   I recommend this book highly to anyone interested in globalization and development. It is extremely well written, though some sections may be slow going for non-economists. The overall analysis should be quite readable and thought-provoking for the general reader wishing to get a fresh perspective on these important issues.

5 comments about Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia.

1. As a student of Russian energy markets, I can confidently say that this book is rife with factual errors. Simple things like calling Iran one of the top gas exporters in the world (Iran doesn't export gas at all, it imports it, though Iran does have some of the largest gas reserves in the world); claiming that liquefied natural gas (LNG) often needs long-term contracts of "two years" to sell (usually needs contracts of 10-20 years); contending that OPEC regulated the oil market through production quotas from its founding in 1960 (the production quota system wasn't formally instituted until 1986-1987); etc. The conclusions that Goldman draws from his analysis are largely correct because he knows Russia well, but a lot of the (incorrect) detail he includes demonstrates an interested observer's - not an expert's - understanding of energy markets. If you are an interested observer, go ahead and buy this book. If you are a researcher, you should certainly corroborate the facts in this book.
   
   Overall, the book is filled with detail, most of it correct but some not. I certainly learned something from reading it, things that had slipped under the radar, but I am not convinced that one should trust Marshall Goldman's grasp of energy markets.



2. Goldman's book, Petrostate was somewhat interesting and shed some light on the complexity of business and energy in Russia. His research and references were undeniable but at times (not to his fault) difficult to follow because of the many "smoke and mirrors" corporate structures of many Russian companies and individuals based there. The government is layered with backscratching which he points out brilliantly throughout.
   
   Overall, the book gave me a better understanding of business in Russia and the size and scope of their global position in energy. Good read.



3. The book opens with the sentence "Russia once again an energy superpower and that is exactly what the book is about.
   
   Russia was the most important non-American producer at the start of the 20th century, it was a very important producer during the Cold War years and it lost it completely in the break up of the Soviet Union.
   
   After the desatrous privatisation under Jeltzin the industry was in tatters. Goldman describes clearly and with good analytical depth how under Putin the country slowly got its grip on its most important natural resource back. Needless to say that the methods used were heavy handed and certainly in a general sense morally and legally questionable. This is not new and the saga continues as we read in the news paper every day ( see e.g. the deleopments around the BP-TNK joint venture).
   
   Goldman also analyzes the role the energy industry plays in the overall aim of Russia to be an important power once again. In particular Europeans should watch this with intensity as they are more and omore dependent on Russia for their energy, in particular gas.
   
   In all, a good, readable and enjoyable analysis. The 5th star is missing for the technical flaws pointed out correctly bey another reviewer. Not hurting the conclusions but a bit sloppy indeed.



4. "Petrostate" provides good insights into Russia's comeback after its late 1990s nadir, as well as an understanding of its economic-political strategies.
   
   Russia regained its place as the world's largest oil producer in 2007; energy generates about 30% of Russia's GDP and 60% of its exports. Russia is a major energy provider to Europe and the U.S. The U.S. buys $10 billion of Russian petroleum, LUKoil bought nearly 3,000 U.S. filling stations from Getty Oil and Mobil. Gazprom also provides LNG to the U.S., via a swap arrangement with Algeria. It also provides natural gas to 405 of Germany's homes and many of its factories, as well as much of the rest of Europe. Russia's Gazprom pipelines also play a major role in delivering gas from the "stans."
   
   There is a fair amount of evidence that CIA chief Casey (Reagan administration) worked with Saudi Arabia (mad at Russia for invading Afghanistan) to break Russia's economy via increased S.A. production - however, the data do not provide a clean fit supporting this theory. Low energy prices in 1998 led to Russia defaulting on its debt, as well as many bank failures within the country. Prices quickly recovered in 1999, and along with a 40% increase in production between 2000-2004 transformed Russia into a major holder of foreign currencies. Russia has avoided the "Dutch Disease" because it didn't have much manufacturing, other than defense industries, to start with.
   
   Mass privatization did not begin until mid-1992 under Yeltsin. Oligarch-controlled banks loaned the state money in exchange for stock certificates; most of the state's economic problems were due to companies and individuals failing to pay taxes - only about 3 in 70 did, and even those usually paid much less than owed. It was agreed that if the banks were not repaid, the stock would be sold. This occurred in mostly rigged auctions that, eg. excluded foreigners, and usually at far less than the stock was worth. Thus, auctioning Yukos brought $309 million, vs a market value soon afterwards of $15 billion. Similar actions occurred in the mining industry. Other assets were given away in return for eg. TV stations providing support for Yeltsin.
   
   Capital requirements to establish private commercial banks were only $75,000 in 1989, after inflation; required $750,000 in 1987. "Oligarchs" could achieve this via sales of consumer goods immediately after the ban on their sales was lifted; other sources included trading commodities, taking advantage of government positions to sell hard-to-get commodities (eg. lumber). Legal chicanery and thuggery allowed further aggregations - government insiders during the late 1990s used their positions to exchange rapidly inflating rubles for IMF and Goldman Sachs loans denominated in dollars. (LTCM went bankrupt during this period. Another "trick" was suddenly changing stockholder meeting locations without notifying stockholders not part of management.)
   
   Many banks failed, however, during the commodities downturn, and millions lost their savings - including Gorbachev. Putin stepped in and replaced Russia's graduated tax (maximum 30%) with a 13% flat tax, set goals of increasing GDP 7%/year (double in ten years), and increased military spending 27% in 2005 and another 22% in 2006.
   
   Putin's 1997 dissertation proposed creating effective companies in natural resources and using them to advance Russia's national interests after commandeering them. He also wanted to open manufacturing to foreign investment (help modernize), but retain operating control - again to focus on national interests. ("National interest" was equated with low prices within Russia, and suspending deliveries to foreign countries that don't support Russian policy.)
   
   Putin seized the assets of media moguls that criticized him, then replaced oil leaders involved in "asset-stripping," and maneuvering to sell large portions of their companies to American firms, reach long-term agreements to sell oil to China, and failing to pay taxes. (Oil leaders were also deemed guilty of black market activities, an economic crime in Russia. Further, there was strong evidence some were involved in several murders of both public leaders and private competitors.)
   
   Russia's re-nationalizing industry (typically 50% + 1) has given it leverage greater than with nuclear weapons (they were only useful as threats). Reagan tried to block construction of a new gas pipeline from Russia into Europe, and backed it up by banning use of G.E. pumps and other pumps using American parts. Britain, however, ignored Reagan and supplied the equipment. (Cheney has subsequently made similar efforts elsewhere against Russia, and failed as well.)
   
   Russia has the world's largest reserves of natural gas. Ukraine was receiving gas at about 1/3 the world market price, was warned that if wanted closer relationships with the West it should pay Western prices, and then was cut off when it refused to do so and instead diverted Germany's supplies. Similar haggling has occurred involving Georgia and Hungary - the latter regarding its possible agreement to host a competing gas line.
   
   Russia now is claiming ownership of the North Pole sea bottom as an extension of Russia - experts believe it is rich in energy resources.



5. This book is an important read for anyone with an interest in foreign policy and the role that energy is playing in it.
   
   I have read the book and listened to Marshall Goldman speak, and read the other reviews, and am writing this because I think the other reviewers may be missing an important point. It is not so much about the details of the book, and I am sure there are some factual errors. The story is about Putin and about Energy, and how Putin has turned Russia from a bankrupt nation to an energy and economic. powerhouse. Goldman's main message is that we should understand how Russia is successfully using energy as a tool of foreign policy. For example, much of Europe, particularly Germany and Eastern Europe, is becoming dependent on Russia for natural gas, a principle source of their energy supply. Russia is building Nord Stream, a pipeline under the Baltic to deliver natural gas directly to Germany. Russia has a pipeline under the Black Sea to deliver natural gas through Turkey up to Hungary. Russia recently reduced the supply of oil to the Czech Republic, a clear suggestion that Russia is unhappy with U.S - Czech Missile Defense Agreement. Russia is attempting, with some success, to create a pipeline monopoly for delivering natural gas to Europe. Goldman shows how Gazprom is squeezing the supporters of the non-Russian NABUCCO Pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and thence to Europe, and how Russia, through Gazprom, particularly is creating partnerships with other gas producers, such as Algeria, to be their distribution arm, closing out possible competitors. Goldman describes the concept of having Russian company officers being simultaneously key members of the government, therefore assuring that the companies are supporting government objectives and policies. Gazprom is a particularly good example.
   
   Of course, all of this Russian power comes from a simple fact: the price of oil and natural gas has jumped since 1998, when Russia was almost bankrupt. Putin is the beneficiary even if not the cause of this phenomenon.
   
   One might get dramatic and say that Russia has invaded Europe, with natural gas pipelines rather than tanks. Perhaps we should take note.

5 comments about Gusher of Lies: The Dangerous Delusions of Energy Independence.

1. Gusher of Lies gives a cogent convincing rebuttal to the idea that America should be energy independent.
   
   Robert Bryce is a journalist and author who has been writing about energy issues for awhile. He is thoroughly knowledgeable about the topic and explains the issues clearly.
   
   Gusher of Lies starts with three chapters describing the idea of energy independence in American politics. This sections is a good summary of the politics and press behind the idea.
   
   In part two Bryce gives an overview of energy markets over the past thirty years. I found a lot of new information in this section, and good explanations of a complex subject.
   
   Part three covers in detail why the idea of American energy independence is so flawed. There is a lot of data in this section, and it is presented well. This is obviously an area of strong interest to Bryce. I found the arguments through and convincing.
   
   Part four is were Bryce explains how interdependent we really are, and offers some advice on what we should do. This section is fairly weak. He made the crux of this argument throughout the book, and this sections devolves into show and tell. He describes his visit to Saudi Arabia and Dubai. There was little new in this section. The last two chapters offer some advice about what to do. They mostly seem to say stay the course.
   
   Gusher of Lies is well written thoroughly researched book on an important topic. I learned a lot from reading it. The author is strongest in parts two and three were he leans most heavily on real data. His proscriptive section is weak, in my view.



2. What I love about Gusher of Lies is that it's highly entertaining, educational and subversive, and it will appeal to readers across the political spectrum.
   
   I think so highly of the book that I have the hope -- perhaps naive hope -- that it will open the eyes of voters who have been subjected to the campaign rhetoric of energy independence. You don't have to consider yourself on the left or the right to enjoy Bryce's dissection of those "energy independence" claims.
   
   I particularly enjoyed the chapter on the ethanol scam, and if you don't think it is a scam, just check out the evidence.
   
   Broadly speaking, this is a one-of-a-kind book on the realpolitik of energy.



3. As someone that's been in the energy business for 34 years I am happy to say that this is the best overall book on the energy business I have ever read. The ample supply of cold, hard facts as opposed to rhetoric makes it vastly different from most books that delve into the realms of alternatives to an oil based energy system. I would like to have seen a little more discussion of natural gas and the ongoing development of tight gas plays coupled with the possibilities of Gas to Liquids technology which is superior in many ways to Coal to Liquids.
   
   Having said all that, I found the author way too sanguine about the terrorist threat; and naive concerning the drivers for and intent of Islamic terrorism. The continual "neocon" bashing seemed to serve little purpose other than making the book more palatable to his liberal readers. To be fair he did spend a little time taking liberals to task on the nonsense they spout on energy but it was somewhat cursory compared to going after conservatives which seemed to be much more in his comfort zone. Some of his sources on the more political issues such as "All the Shah's Men" by Stephen Kinzer are more than a little dubious and certainly not objective.
   
   The energy stuff would rate five stars or more if that were possible. Too bad he had to salt the broth with liberal talking points related to the political issues. Even so this book is highly recommeded for anyone that wishes to become knowledgeable on the energy business.



4. This is a great book. "Gusher of Lies" goes too far. As does "Dangerous Delusions." Robert Bryce does not make a case for lots of lying and delusional behavior by proponents of energy independence. The title of the book is hyperbole.
   
   But Bryce does make a case for working on energy "inter"dependence, rather than "in"dependence. Energy issues are hard to handle. Nothing simple about them. Bryce takes the time to look at them carefully. He writes well, and supports his case with facts and argument.
   
   Hyperbole aside, Bryce makes a very persuasive case that we will be better off if we strengthen our energy connections with all other countries around the globe. Not try to wall ourselves off with energy independence.
   
   But critics of this book are right on one point -- you will not get a fair view from this book of the case for the other side. Bryce does what he implies in the title of the book. He treats those who support energy independence as lying and delusional. For Bryce, if you do not agree with him, you are wrong. Period.
   
   That focus on the one side did not bother me. This book is like a buffet with a limited selection. I supped on the facts, and spurned the opinion. That gave me a hearty meal. I enjoyed Bryce's writing style. His organization was particularly well done. I have read many books and articles on this subject, but Bryce presented facts and arguments that I had not seen before.
   
   Different people have different tastes. If you do not share Bryce's view on energy independence, and do not like to hear only a view you do not share, you will find little to your taste here. You will go away hungry, perhaps completely empty.
   
   If, on the other hand, you have an open mind on energy independence, give this book a read. You will, I'm pretty sure, come away with as full and satisfying a feeling as I did. Bryce's book is as good a book as I've read for a while, on any subject.
   
   My habit when reading a book is to tear up a piece of paper for bookmarks to put into pages I want to come back to later. The first fifty pages into the book I had already marked most pages. Later pages got less. But that's the first time I can remember marking more than ten pages in a book, let alone fifty. That told me something.
   
   Bryce's book may not appeal to everyone. But it appealed to me. Ignore the hyperbole, and I think you will find a great book.



5. Mr. Bryce's Gusher of Lies is a bracing antidote to the pervasive fantasy of U.S. "energy independence." Touted for over 35 years by any number of people who should know better (including, alarmingly, both of our most recent presidential candidates), the chimera of energy independence has misinformed American domestic and foreign policy and acted as a kind of soothing substitute for reasoned actions on America's undeniable energy problem. Lately, and most perniciously, energy independence has been sold as a natural and necessary step in the country's War on Terror. In his extensively researched and closely reasoned book, Mr. Bryce persuasively shows that achieving energy independence is technically infeasible, economically undesirable and of no particular value to our national security.
   
   In a career in the energy field that has spanned six presidential administrations, I have yet to hear "energy independence" explicitly renounced as a policy goal, and yet the nation has moved steadily in the opposite direction. Mr. Bryce's book will show the open-minded reader why this has happened and why it's time we ceased pursuing a pipe dream in lieu of formulating a rational energy policy.

5 comments about Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century.

1. 
   I read books in groups, and bought this one along with David Walsh's "Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations" which I recommend above this one is you are only buying one book. I also read and have reviewed "Global Class Wars" as well as all other books I recommend below.
   
   Although I was less interested in the history, which is very well documented and clearly explained, and more in the lessons for the future, I found two clear bottom lines in this book that are supported by its extensive research:
   
   1) Open societies and open democracies generate more money and more opportunity and more innovation than closed or failed societies; and
   
   2) Keynes was right, there is an urgent vital role for government to play in addressing the social networks, including education, transportation, rules of commerce, and so on, that allow capitalism to work.
   
   The author distinguishes between individual, cooperative, and competitive capitalism, and I found validation in this book for my concept of communal capitalism, a capitalism that is guided by government in avoiding the exportation of jobs, the importation of poverty, and the impoverishment of the middle class.
   
   Unlike David Walsh's book, this book has more of a focus on what is moral and pragmatic, and so I recommend William Greider's "The Soul of Capitalism" as well as John Perkins "Confessions of an Economic Hit Man."
   
   I have a very strong feeling from this book and others, that the era of "out of control" capitalism is drawing to an end. We may even see the end of the corporation as a separate legal personality in the next 12 years. The transparency of information that is available when people attach themselves leech-like to a corporation and hold it accountable (see my review of "No Logo") is creating a powerful antidote against the Enrons and Exxons and Wal-Marts of the world who bribe elites and screw over the publics on both ends. I also see Wall Street losing its ability to "explode the client" (see my review of "Liar's Poker"). A great deal of good will be done in the next quarter century, and it will come from a combination of good government and educated engaged citizens working together across all boundaries.



2. Jeffrey Frieden, a Harvard professor specializing in international trade and finance, has written a masterly and comprehensive history of capitalism from 1870 to the present. His history of globalization reminds us that it is not a recent develpment and that its current success is not guaranteed.
   
   The first era of globalization (1870 to 1914) had many of the same characteristics as today's. There was an unprecedented cross-border movement of goods, capital, and labor. (Labor more so in the first era.) During these years huge amounts of capital moved overseas to America, Canada, and Argentina mainly due to the reduced costs of communication and transportation. The technologies driving this globalization were the telegraph and railroads. It was also facilitated by the fact that most currencies were convertible to gold. The investment in the Americas was also followed by a huge immigrant population. In these years, America, Canada, and Argentina had much larger immmigrant populations at the turn of the 20th century than today.
   
   The main thing that distinguishes the present globalization from the first is what happened in between. After the Great Depression and World War II remedies were put into place to mitigate the damaging effects of these economic and social catastrophes. Social benefits such as unions, minimum wage, healthcare and pensions were established as safety nets. In the era between the two globalizations when economies were mostly national the safety nets were part of the social contract between capital and labor.
   
   In 1980, when our current era of globalization begins, capital began to move overseas again in order to find countries with lower labor and social costs. This time, however, labor did not follow. The industrialized countries now have large middle classes with social benefits promised who are not certain about how they are going to be paid. This is causing many in the industrialized world to have second thoughts about our current phase of globalization.
   
   Frieden has a guarded optimism about global capitalism and thinks it is still the best system for distributing wealth. Yet, his last chapter "Global Capitalism Troubled" points to some more clouds on the horizon. There seems to be a growing gap between those who control capital and those who work for a living. People understand that globalization is inevitable but they want a new set of rules to address the growing inequalities.
   
   Frieden is a cheerleader for a more equitable capitalism that can deliver both social benefits and robust economic growth.



3. I was almost tempted to give the book a miss after seeing the high ratings that were given by reviewers that seemed to be anti-globalizationists (what an awkward term!)
   
   However, I came across the book at my library and gave it a chance, and I was not disappointed. It is a book that does a creditable job of summing up the ups and downs of the world economy over the past hundred years and more. And it also does a fairly good job of raising some issues and problems with the world economic system, and how the system had evolved to meet those issues and problems. On the whole, I think it's a balanced book, pointing out the critical need for free and integrated markets to raising millions in the world out of poverty, as well as some of the problems facing them.
   
   The only reason why I gave the book a four rather than a five is that it is not an easy read, and it is best read with some thought and analysis on the reader's part. Not necessarily a bad thing, but not something for everyone.
   
   By the way, do ignore those reviews that pretend to tell you what the author was saying in his book. I'm not sure that he's actually saying what they say he is saying.
   
   Read the book for yourself. It's worth the time and effort.



4. Of all the many books that have come out in recent years about global capitalism, finance and economics, this is certainly the worst. The author, a professor of government at Harvard, professes to specialize in international monetary history, but is really what his tenure title says he is, a professor of International Peace. He appears to be trying to reinvent his career by tackling the subject of capitalism but thoroughly lacks understanding of the subject matter, as made evident by his book.
   
   1. The author makes the same mistake that virtually all political science professors do when they write about capitalism: he glorifies the gold standard, he glorifies the Rothschilds and glorifies everything that had nothing to do with the emergence of twentieth century capitalism. The author is using his expertise in international relations to analyze a subject that is really never about governments, or grand alliances or fancy bankers. He thus fails to root the story in the advent of technology, or of business procedures or of the individual investor, but focuses instead of John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson and Lord Halifax.
   
   2. Wherever the subject matter is strong, the book still fails badly. It does so because political economy is better analyzed by Robert Gilpin and others, whose books are mandatory reading and well written and which do not pretend to sell that subject matter as a study of capitalism.
   
   3. The book's sections are surprisingly badly arranged. Sometimes one feels the author may have a method to the madness but I doubt it after having read it. It is certainly not thematic, or designed to trigger thought or chronological.
   
   4. The book refers to a poem only twice in the 500 pages and it is about the King of Ghana! I mean a professor at Harvard should surely know how to maintain balance in his subject matter. Is that the one poem he could find worth including?
   
   5. Stunning is the lack of understanding of the issues. He describes Britain as fully supportive of free trade mid-19th century but fails to consider how colonialism could be a form of free trade. He describes China Turkey and India as the only failures of the early 20th century without making the same connection with colonialism.
   
   6. Worse is his understanding of the gold standard. He never mentions that that relic was responsible for more misery than anything other than world wars. He fails to consider that since the gold standard was weakened in the Forties, there have been NO PANICS RAVAGING SOCIETY. He is a gold bug.
   
   7. He repeats William Bryan's Cross of Gold speech twice in the narrative with no suggestion that he is even aware his haphazard narrative is repeating the same quote. He also fails to mention that William Bryan was not buried in the election of 1896 but actually came to dominate the 20th century, what with unionism, minimum wages, no gold standard, empowerment of the individual investor and every other idea that Bryan first espoused. TR's and FDR's reforms were nothing if not Bryanism.
   
   8. Why would a book mention so much about Rothschild's and their family in the US without mentioning Jacob Schiff, or detailing JP Morgan, or RObert Lehman or Albert Gordon. I mean the author simply has no balance on the subject matter because he knows so little about it.
   
   9. Finally, it is not clear what Jeffrey Frieden is doing at Harvard. Such poorly researched fare is common to COlumbia Business School and its Dean Glenn Hubbard, or to the Hoover Institution or some place like that. Harvard on the other hand puts out more balanced and far more thoughtful pieces.
   
   BAD BOOK THAT MUST BE AVOIDED.



5. This was one of the best business books that I have ever read. It provides a thorough overview of the history of business globalization, yet it is not academic at all. Although it is long and has a few, short dry spots, it is an easy read that is engaging from beginning to end. The lessons from history are very applicable today. I highly recommend the book to anyone that works for a global company or wants to understand the forces of globalization and the impacts on our economy today.

4 comments about The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World.

1. The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World is a phenomenally insightful book that looks at the sources of innovation and the characteristics of innovations that receive venture funding.
   
   The evidence is compelling and surprising. The data suggests that the key to innovation is finding solutions that already exist. Successful innovation is not about inventing new solutions. It is about inventing new applications of existing solutions. This book may be more powerful as we learn to really leverage the Internet in development.
   
   It may modify innovation and R&D at every institution that studies the book.



2. 
   I read this book as I had come across the author's views that that, in addition to innovative inputs , entrepreurial firms require venturesome and resourceful customers who are willing to take a chance on their products and services. Too often I think innovation is viewed as the result of back room boffins planning and researching, whereas in fact the real world of trial, error and customers who are willing to adapt and suppliers who are willing to change is more real. There is a wonderful Dilbert cartoon where Dilbert proudly shows Dogbert the world's first video phone. Dilbert is ecstatic at his purchase, placing it on his desk saying `and all we have to do now is wait for someone else to buy one and we can talk'. Dogbert ruefully notes that societies material progress relies on people like Dilbert.
   Amar Bhidé's an Indian-born, professor of Business at Columbia elegantly begins his discussion of innovation as follows "Just as a devout Hindu might begin a journey with a prayer to the Lord Ganesh, it is obligatory to start a discussion on modern innovation by invoking Joseph Schumpeter" Having nodded towards the master, he then proceeds to deconstruct, if not actually slaughter, the sacred cow that is the Schumpeterian model of innovation. This for me is a major strength of the book,it has become fashionable to take creative destruction - the utter replacement of one technology by another, as the basis for the cycles of prosperity and innovation. Yet the reality is somewhat different - in the 1930's typewriters were predicted to eliminate the need to write by hand, yet in 1990 sixteen billion pencils were sold; and
   In most markets, a large majority of people will possess both a landline and a mobile phone, despite the potential of the mobile to replace the landline. While I believe that creative destruction as a model remains important for companies investing in new product research - as in Cristensen;s `innovators dilemma' and Foster's `attacker's advantage', however Bhidé's view that markets remain both more sophisticated and complex than one simple model, is both instructive and refreshing.
   Bhidé's core argument is that the US consumer is assertive, adventurous and capable - in short, venturesome - in relation to new products. In what other market would such a significant group of customers exist who would be so open to products such as the iPod, who are willing to pay prices which will justify significant investment and who are open to being `experimented upon' ( ref. Fredrich Hayek). Bhidé reviews the work of a sample of US - based venture capital firms and the ventures they invest in, to draw conclusions about the exceptionalism of the US customer. In a variation of the `coming to America' theme, Bhidé documents how `making it' in the US first is hugely important for success, even for firms whose founders originate elsewhere. Indeed the US customer is blind to the national origins of product, the company or the individuals involved in providing the product/service.
   I had three major concerns with this thesis - firstly the sample set, as Bhidé acknowledges ( indeed he has a major sideswipe at ecomoetric analysis) , was not scientifically representative, and perhaps cannot be, but therefore runs the risk of being anecdotal. More importantly the VCs were US-based, I would have felt more comfortable with comparisons between success rates in US versus other VCs (the Israeli VC industry is well developed) and with other developmental paradigms - what about emerging companies in BRIC countries (for example)? Most importantly of all, the US is exceptional in terms of GDP per capita and technological prowess, so it may be easy to fall into the trap of stating that because it is rich, it is exceptional. An alternative may be that because it has been exceptional - no invasions in the 20th Century, opposed by an economic system which imploded - it is now rich. I think it would have been useful to examine markets in technology areas where the US is not the leader (eg. Korea for broadband Access, Europe for mobile phone penetration) to see whether venturesome consumers exist, or whether other parameters are important. I find it difficult to believe that US consumers are so significant different to other consumers, in their uptake of new products, that this justifies a permanent exceptionalism. Nonetheless the arguments made are thought provoking and useful.
   Bhidé remains optimistic about the potential for American industry and competitive enterprise within the global economy, and frequently disparages and disproves proponents of exclusion and economic and/or technological nationalism. Such optimism is refreshing (it should be noted the book was written before the Credit Crunch morphed into the Crisis of Capitalism), and forward looking, nonetheless it remains to be seen if (and it's a huge, world-transforming if) Chinese and Indian GDP per capita approaches US figures, will US firms and society still maintain their competitive edge. This is not to argue for economic nationalism, just to put a dampening comment that it is unlikely that 6% of the worlds population will remain so much a determinant of technological innovation and economic prosperity in a future where another 40% is coming to economic self-determination.
   One last point, I was puzzled by the inclusion of chapters on immigration into the US. In so far as I understood it, I think the point being made was that the US society was a welcoming meritocracy, which formed a mutually beneficial relationship with all, suitably qualified and motivated, comers. I did not think this fit with the general thrust of the argument, though its possible that my reading the book was tilted towards what it had to say about innovation, and that I was not sufficiently connected to the prosperity-generating side of Bhidé's argument.



3. I found Bhide's new book excellent on a number of levels. He makes quite convincing overall cases for his leading theses: first, that 'venturesome' actors throughout the US economy --including especially businesses as customers willing to try out new technologies offered them-- have been the key to the US distinctive productivity performance and second, the related and surprising proposition that fundamental research --so long as it gets done somewhere--has not been and won't be the driver of relative growth performance for the US in the future.
   
   Bhide does a good job with the supporting lines of his inquiry. He provides a first-rate description of the whys and hows of venture capital-supported enterprises. He also carries the argument that many, even large-scale investments in new processes and techniques in the services sector and elsewhere that have turned out to be fundamentally important to productivity advances were done, not with a fine economic calculus of costs and benefits, but rather in an entrepreneurial, venturesome spirit in the face of 'Knightian,' unquantifiable uncertainty.
   
   I found the book rich with nuanced and illuminating business examples taken from his research for the book. Nice to have a bold set of propositions built from a real-world, fact- based approach.



4. The book is a thoroughly researched, eloquently argued and highly persuasive piece. It's central thesis is that technological innovation is a complex, multiplayer game in which America still leads the world by a long way. American scientific, technological and economic pre-eminence are thus not going away anytime soon. The book goes on to argue that "neo-protectionist" fears are unwarranted, and shows how they will probably undermine America's economic might in the long run.
   
   The book comes with impeccable credentials. It is authored by Amar Bhide, the Lawrence D. Glaubinger Professor of Business at Columbia University. Prof Bhide is also a co-researcher of Edmund Phelps, 2006 Nobel Laureate in Economics who is an authority on, among other things, the relationship between investment in education and research on the one hand, and economic growth on the other.
   
   And Prof Bhide could hardly have chosen a better time to weigh in, as anti-offshoring rhetoric can be expected to rise over the next few months. It must be noted that the primary purport of the book is not to support outsourcing or offshoring,and I am sure nothing could be farther from the author's mind than to be painted as a torchbearer for the outsourcing brigade. Nonetheless, the arguments presented therein can be read as making a substantial case for a more liberal approach toward outsourcing.
   
   The author marshals an astonishing array of evidence in supporting his thesis, stitching together data and information from diverse disciplines. He presents data to show that protectionist fears in the 1980s that the US would soon be overtaken by Germany and Japan, which focused on rigorous planning of their scientific manpower, proved baseless as the US prospered while the ostensible aggressors largely floundered. He says things are no different this time, with China and India.
   
   The book's arguments can broadly be summed up as follows:
   
   * Wealth arises not so much from creating new technological breakthroughs as from the capacity to benefit from those breakthroughs.
   
   * This 'capacity to benefit' is a higher order capacity that includes elements such as the ability to create products based on those technological breakthroughs, the ability to market those products well, the ability to take risk and freedom from over-regulation. In particular, "venturesome consumption" - the propensity of consumers to embrace products based on new technologies - is vital.
   * The US has most parts of this diverse puzzle - particularly venturesome consumption - and is hence best positioned to benefit from new technologies. This is true even of new technological innovations produced abroad. As an example, the author avers, the exceptional ability of US companies to use IT has been a strong reason why US productivity has outpaced that in Europe in Japan.
   
   * Hence allowing technological breakthroughs to happen abroad certainly does not hurt, and possibly benefits , the US. The author offers the example of the iPod, much of whose technology originated in Europe and Asia, but which wouldn't have achieved the success it has without venturesome US consumers - who have in turn reaped huge benefits by so consuming the device.
   * This higher-order capacity is deeply rooted in various economic, social, cultural and psychological structures and is hence highly sticky, which makes it difficult for the US to lose it - and for other countries to acquire it.
   
   The author also introduces the notion of "nondestructive creation" (innovation that creates new products and services without displacing existing ones) in addition to the familiar Schumpeterian creative destruction. Such nondestructive creation creates new jobs without eliminating existing ones. At least in the nontradable services sector, these new jobs will have to stay in the US and cannot migrate to low cost locations.
   
   Thus, Prof. Bhide assures us, there is unlikely to be a giant sucking sound anytime soon.
   
   One potential objection that occurs to me, that protectionists may raise: relying too strongly on the 'nontradable services' argument may amount to standing on shifting sands at best. Several services thought to be nontradable have turned out to be tradable after all. IT services themselves were thought to be nontradable for long, until Indian IT service companies showed they could cross borders. Even advertising, which is highly culture- and context- specific - has been offshored (Lenovo has headquartered all its marketing activities outside China in Bangalore).
   
   The book also perhaps bypasses one major theme on the subject of 'how innovation sustains prosperity in a connected world' (and this is also my favorite argument in favor of why developed economies including the US should not be chary of allowing high-end work - and high-paying jobs - to flow abroad): a lot of the prosperity that so 'leaks away' from developed economies comes right back in the form of demand for products and services. As an example, Indian IT outsourcing companies are perhaps the largest airline customers in the world, as tens of thousands of workers travel each year between India and the countries where clients are located. These airlines such as United and Lufthansa are mostly headquartered in developed countries. Similarly, the same India-based outsourcers lap up the laptops, PCs, servers and networking equipment made by Dell, Sun and Cisco. They are huge buyers of software produced by Microsoft, IBM, Oracle and SAP. These companies (and their employees) can safely be assumed to have an insatiable appetite for the latest cellular phones and so forth from the likes of Apple, Nokia and RIM. These companies also employ legions of workers at or close to client locations - workers who pay taxes and pump money into local economies. Many of these companies are listed on US and European stock exchanges, allowing people there to participate in their wealth creation. Thus, prosperity 'leaking' abroad contributes to prosperity in the developed economies - not in some nebulous, long-term sense but in a way that is direct and almost immediate.
   
   These are but minor quibbles - the book cuts a wide swathe in making its elaborate argument convincing. Along the way, the author explores the question of why companies buy IT. The notorious 'Productivity paradox', which held that IT has not contributed to productivity gains in business - is firmly laid to rest. He avers that IT has brought new ways of doing business, and also delivered significant benefits to the customers of those businesses that used IT, which are ignored by conventional productivity statistics. Another interesting topic examined is that of why people acquire education (particularly higher education), and how universities perceive the economic value they impart to their graduates.

5 comments about The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom.

1. I first became familiar with Benkler after reading his paper, "Coase's Penguin" in undergraduate study. I was delighted to hear of the publication of this book. Benkler continues beautifully where he left off in his previous papers and synthesizes an excellent theory of social production in his book.
   
   Benkler begins by describing the economic shape of information - it's non-rival and builds upon itself. He explains the challenges that face information, particularly the Babel Objection. Benkler also covers some legal background on aspects of a "liberal society", such as the role of commons versus private property.
   
   From there, he makes his way into peer production. He touches different aspects of this type of production, from open source to distributed content production & filtering (click workers) to the results of the FCC's shift towards commons-based wireless policy. I found chapter 4, where he connects social production to the economic concepts discussed earlier, to be the most interesting chapter of the book.
   
   He moves on to a lengthy discussion of the political effects of network distribution and social production, including a summary of the history of mass media and predictions about the future. From there, he lays down his argument that we ought to continue to encourage open networks and information sharing. He presents a discussion on current legislation and legal challenges to information and provides some examples of solutions.
   
   I read this book coming out of an undergraduate program in Information Science and wished I had read this book perhaps my sophomore or junior year. Benkler essentially lays out, in linear form, the precise message that my professors were teaching. Because of networks, information science in the 21st century will not follow the traditional industrial-style of distribution but rather a distributed and non-proprietary model. Its impact is phenomenal, not only in the realm of economics and science but politics, culture, and interpersonal communication.
   
   This book ought to be required reading for every undergraduate student studying Telecommunications, Media, or Information Science.



2. I have been hearing about Yochai Benkler's book, "The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms," for some time and his exposition around what he (and many others) have called the "networked information economy." Benkler, a Yale law professor, also offers his 527 page (473 in text) book as a free PDF from his web site under a Creative Commons share alike license.
   
   First, let me say, there are a couple of worthwhile insights in the book, which I'll get to in a moment. But mostly, I found the book overly long, often off-subject, and too political for my tastes. In fairness, some of this might be due to the fact it was written in 2005 (published in 2006) and the social and participatory aspects of the Web are now widely appreciated. Yet I fear the broader problem with this polemic is that it proves the adage that you see what you look for.
   
   Benkler's argument is that cheap processors and the Internet have removed the physical constraints on effective information production. This is in keeping with the non-proprietary nature of information as a "nonrival" good, and is also leading to the democratization of information production and the emergence of large-scale peer-produced content. Benkler generally allies himself with the camp of technology optimists. His observations about trends and new developments from Ebay to Wikipedia to SETI@home and open source software are now commonly appreciated.
   
   With the costs of information duplication and dissemination trending to zero, the limiting factor of production becomes human creativity and effort itself. But here, too, with hundreds of millions of Internet users, just a few hours of contributed content from each can easily swamp the ability of even the largest firms to compete. These trends to Benkler presage a "radical decentralization" of information production, and many other changes to the political economy and culture.
   
   That radical changes in the nature of information production and authorship and even the role of traditional publishers or the media are underway is without question. Purposeful collaborations like Wikipedia are now clearly successful and were not forecasted by many.
   
   The lens, however, in which Benkler looks at all of these trends is through the "modern" history of the mass media. Citing Paul Starr's "Creation of the Media," he notes how in 15 years from 1835 to 1850 the cost of setting up a mass-circulation paper increased from $10,000 to over $2 million (in 2005 dollars). In Benkler's view, these cost increases shifted the ability to publish away from the common citizen into the "problem" hands of the mass media. Fortunately, now with the Internet and cheap processors, this evil can be reversed. Though Benkler specifically disclaims that he is not describing "an exercise in pastoral utopianism," the fact is that is exactly what he is describing.
   
   There can be no doubt that the role of mass media and traditional publishers is under severe challenge from the emergence of the Internet. It is also the case that we are witnessing citizen publishers and authors emerge by the millions. These changes are momentous, but they do not involve everyone -- only comparatively small percentages of Internet users blog and still smaller percentages contribute to Wikipedia (about 80,000 at present based on a user base of hundreds of millions). And, as the traditional gatekeepers of printers, publishers and editors lose prominence, new institutions and mechanisms for establishing the authoritativeness and trustworthiness of content will surely need to evolve.
   
   These real trends deserve thoughtful exploration.
   
   However, there is a reason that publishing costs increased so rapidly in that era of the 1800s. Mass publishing and pulp paper were emerging that acted to bring an increasing storehouse of content and information to the public at levels never before seen.
   
   The explosion of information content that occurred at this very same time correlates well with the fundamental historical changes in human wealth and economic growth. Though mass media may prove to be an historical artifact, I would argue that its role in bringing literacy and information to the "masses" was generally an unalloyed good and the basis for an improvement in economic well being the likes of which had never been seen.
   
   By taking a narrow historical horizon and then viewing it through the lens of the vilified "mass media," Benkler is both looking in the wrong direction and missing the point.
   
   The information by which the means to produce and disseminate information itself is changing and growing. These changes in information infrastructure support an inexorable trend to more adaptability, more wealth and more participation. What we are seeing now with the Internet is but a natural continuation of that trend. The "mass media" and the costs of information production of the 1800s was a natural phase within this longer, historical trend. The multiplier effect of information itself will continue to empower and strengthen the individual, not in spite of mass media or any other ideologically based viewpoint but due to the freeing and adaptive benefits of information itself. Information is the natural antidote to entropy and, longer term, to the concentrations of wealth and power.
   
   By trying to push the trends of the Internet through the false needle's eye of political economics, an effort that Benkler also erroneously makes with his earlier analysis of the growth of radio, what are in essence historical forces of almost informational or technological determinism are falsely presented as matters of political choice. Hogwash.
   
   Benkler, however, does observe two useful dimensions for measuring social collaboration efforts: modularity and granularity. By modularity, Benkler means "a property of a project that describes the extent to which it can be broken down into smaller components, or modules, that can be independently produced before they are assembled into a whole." By granularity, Benkler means "the size of the modules, in terms of the time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them."
   
   Benkler's insight is that "the number of people who can, in principle, participate in a project is therefore inversely related to the size of the smallest scale contribution necessary to produce a usable module. The granularity of the modules therefore sets the smallest possible individual investment necessary to participate in a project. If this investment is sufficiently low, then incentives" for producing that component of a modular project can be of trivial magnitude. Most importantly for our purposes of understanding the rising role of nonmarket production, the time can be drawn from the excess time we normally dedicate to having fun and participating in social interactions."
   
   To illustrate this effect of granularity, he contrasts Wikipedia with its simple entries and editing and bounded topics with the far-less successful Wikibooks, which has much larger granularity.
   
   Creators of social collaboration sites are advised to keep granularity small to encourage broader contributions, and if the nature of the site is complex, to increase the number of its modules. Of course, none of this guarantees the magic or timing that also lie behind the most successful sites!
   
   I think that Benkler's arguments could have been more effectively distilled into a 30-page article, with much of the political economy claptrap thrown out. The book is definitely worth a skim.



3. A great book, even though it took Amazon nearly a month to send me the book.
   
   An optimistic look at the ways online networks can better our society by strengthening democracy and creating more equality. A little dry in places, but an excellent resource for understanding how the Internet fits into the global economy.



4. This work was assigned in my last semester of law school. For the most part, I (like many others) did not see the worth in law school other than to become a good lawyer and make money. After reading this book, I feel all of the previous courses that I took in law school (mainly the IP ones) have more value.
   
   I would recommend this work to anyone wanting to see how copyright and patent laws effect/interact with society and culture beyond the "incentive theory" that is the primary focus of most copyright and patent law courses.



5. "How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom" is an apt subheading for "The Wealth of Networks" by Yochai Benkler. The book encompasses topics as broad as the name suggests.
   
   The five-hundred page book provides a sweeping take on networks, covering nearly everything from the history of radio to the future of information law and policy. The dense Introduction may take readers several days to wade through, but offers the core messages of the book, compacted into twenty-eight pages. After breaking further into the book, the weight is lifted as the author's ideas are presented more freely, with space dedicated to supplementary explanations and examples.
   
   The Wealth of Networks is a book worth reading and provides a respectable overview of many topics, with an array of perspectives to consider. Benkler presents his viewpoints nicely. A few points of contention for the reader can be seen in occasionally repetitious or presumptuous statements that break the flow of reading. In addition, the stand-alone style of each chapter is suggestive of a lesson plan for teachers.
   
   To his credit, Benkler does well to ensure that his stance on each issue is quite clear; it is evident that he is a liberal proponent of freedoms and rights: "Freedom--the freedom to speak, but also to be free from manipulation and to be cognizant of many and diverse options--inheres in this (networked environment) radically greater diversity of information, knowledge, and culture through which to understand the world and imagine how one could be" (p. 168). "The increasing feasibility of nonmarket, nonproprietary production of information, knowledge, and culture, and of communications and computation capacity holds the promise of increasing the degree of autonomy for individuals in the networked information economy" (p. 174).
   
   Despite pushing the agenda of his own political lens, Benkler does a fair job of offering both sides of his arguments. He does not just force his ideas on his reader, but rather gives an analysis of opposing views in order to prove why he believes his points ought to prevail. For example, on page 233, Benkler clearly outlines the five basic critiques about the Internet as a tool for democratization, and proceeds on page 237 with: "The remainder of this chapter is devoted to responding to these critiques, providing a defense of the claim that the Internet can contribute to a more attractive liberal public sphere." On page 271 he responds with a diplomatic answer to the critiques: "The first generation of statements that the Internet democratizes was correct but imprecise." He continues with: "The network allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public sphere. They no longer need be consumers and passive spectators. They can become creators and primary subjects. It is in this sense that the Internet democratizes."(p. 272).
   
   With ideas repeated throughout the book, each chapter could stand alone - a benefit to an instructor looking to teach just one portion of the book. However, from a leisure reader's perspective, such redundancies can interrupt the flow of reading. For example, Chapter 6, page 199, states "The Sinclair Broadcast Group is one of the largest owners of television broadcast stations in the United States" and Chapter 7, page 220, states "Sinclair, which owns major television stations..." Such repetitions may cause readers to feel disoriented and pause to determine if they are accidentally re-reading a chapter, because the ideas were recently addressed and are still top-of-mind. This repetitive manner makes the chapters ideal for teachers who may want to teach just one section; otherwise, the repetition disrupts the flow of the book.
   
   Another disruption to the flow of reading is Benkler's occasional use of broad or all-assuming statements. Despite his qualitative examples, Benkler sometimes uses statements that seem unfounded, or too general to be stated in the factual manner he uses. Benkler's "universals" may cause a reader to pause in order to consider the validity of such statements, and question what research or qualifications led Benkler to make such assertions. The following three sentences offer examples.
   
   First: "The rise of global information economic structures and relationships affect human beings everywhere" (p. 19). Second: "This causes the person offered the money either to believe the offerer, and thereby lose self-esteem and reduce effort, or to resent him and resist the offer" (p. 94). Third: "The practice of producing culture makes us all more sophisticated readers, viewers, and listeners, as well as more engaged makers" (p. 275).
   
   These definitive statements about "human beings everywhere," the instigators of personal resentment and self-esteem, and conditions that "make us all more sophisticated" are presumptuous and unsupported. The accumulation of such unfounded "facts" may cause readers to pause, thereby breaking the flow of reading.
   
   In conclusion, despite the foregoing shortcomings of some statements and structure, The Wealth of Networks is a work worth reading. Benkler offers insights into a broad range of topics and makes his points by presenting opposing views, thus providing readers with both sides of the issue at hand. I would recommend this book, but forewarn readers that it can be a lengthy read at times.

No comments about The Coming First World Debt Crisis.