2 comments about Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence.

1. I really expected far more from this textbook. It adds very little to already existing graduate textbooks on trade. It is not useful for graduate students that want to understand the literature of the 2000s. It assumes you already know the material. It debotes a lot of space to the old literature at the expense of the new one. This is a field that has changed significantly. Frankly, I find hard to see its value added.



2. In my opinion this is the best book currently available for a graduate course in real-trade theory. I have already used it twice in class and my students have invariably preferred it to other recent works available, e.g., K.Y. Wong or Bhagwati et al. Compared to these, this book is better written and focuses judiciously on the models that yield the sharpest conclusions and most relevant insights. Discussions of the significance of gravity models, foreign investments, political economy, free trade areas, and institutional factors in trade (e.g., ethnic networks) are particularly clear and up to date compared with other texts.

   The required mathematical apparatus (e.g., envelope and duality results) is introduced naturally, intuitively, and only as and when it is needed. The English flows easily, and the interweaving of theoretical and empirical material is especially novel and welcome.

   This book should set the standard for writing graduate texts.

2 comments about The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline.

1. This book deals with several major policy problems that Europe and Europeans are facing today. The usual suspects include non-competitive research and universities, mishandling of the increasingly multiethnic societies, liberalization of markets, high price of the social state, rigid labor market, to name just a few. There seems to be an increasing amount of literature and critical articles dedicated to these issues, in a stark contrast to the inability of European politicians to get a firm grip on them. Even though this book claims that Europe should not necessarily adopt Anglo-Saxon social and economic model, it is hard to escape this conclusion when reading the actual comparisons with the UK, US and other "Anglo-Saxon" countries.
   
   One big policy issue that is not being discussed here deals with the collapse of the European family and its roots in the dismantling of the Judeo-Christian religio-ethical tradition. A good place to start reading more about this is George Weigel's "The Cube And The Cathedral: Europe, America and Politics Without God"
   
   Additional criticism of this book concerns its editing. There are numerous spelling and other mistakes, and several graphs and charts are not all that clear. Otherwise, it is a very readable and engaging book.



2. I read carefully Alesina's book. It is well written and it really gives Europe and Europeans something to think about. Basically, the authors defend that Europe should start doing things "The American Way", that is, work more, attract young researchers/scientists to universities and spend more in military programs.
   
   Several of these ideas are valid and I believe the authors are completely right in their insights, namely, the absolute need to attract young scientists and researchers to european universities.
   
   This being said, there are other issues, where it is unclear Europe could follow the approach the authors sugggested:
   
   a) Banks - the authors defend European banking system should learn some lessons from the American Banks. The book was written in 2006, there is, before subprime crisis. To be honest, I don't think Europe should copy the US Banks model of management. And subprime crisis is right here to prove what I am saying;
   
   b) Military spending: this is the most controversial aspect of Alesina's book. Military spendig is connected to one of the last barriers of sovereignity - military secrets, national defense system, industrial secrets. It is impossible to forget what could be the reaction inside Europe, if national governments started a big military program. Suppose, Germany would say: "we are going to start a giantic military program". I don't think UK or France would be at ease.
   
   A possible solution: European programmes. But once again, this is easier to say than done. Europe is at peace only for 60 years. It is not exactly peaceful to agree on military spending/programmes.
   
   All in all, it is an interesting book. But some of the ideas, I am afraid can work really well in a Union such as the USA, but probably not in European Union.

No comments about The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (Initiative for Policy Dialogue).

4 comments about Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia.

1. Cassandra was the Trojan woman whom Apollo gave the gift of prophesy-and the curse of never being believed. Yegor Gaidar sees that Russia's future depends crucially on coming to grips with its past, but present events make it clear that his prophesies, like Cassandra's, fall on deaf ears.
   
   In his new book, Collapse of an Empire, Gaidar has a pressing purpose: to alert Russians-and the world-to the dangers denying the real reasons behind the collapse of the USSR. Gaidar has a strong historical sense (which is often absent among economists, alas), and from his understanding of history (most notably, of Weimar Germany and post-Hapsburg Austria-Hungary), he knows that imperial collapse can be disorienting and dispiriting to the empire's subjects, even if the empire brutally repressed them. He also knows that demagogues and revanchists can exploit this disorientation and depression to achieve power. Those suffering from post-empire depression are very susceptible to demagogic myths that imperial glory was destroyed by "stabs in the back" from enemies foreign and domestic, and that restoration of this glory requires the people to unite behind an authoritarian leader who will ruthlessly pursue traitors at home and take revenge on foreign foes.
   
   But he foresees that this is ultimately the road to disaster:
   
   The legend of a flourishing and mighty country destroyed by foreign enemies is a myth dangerous to the country's future. . . . This is the picture that dominates Russian public opinion: (1) twenty years ago there existed a stable, developing and powerful country, the Soviet Union; (2) strange people (perhaps agents of foreign intelligence services) started political and economic reforms within it; (3) the results of these reforms were catastrophic; (4) in 1999-2000 people came to power who were concerned with the country's state interests; (5) life became better after that. This myth is as far from the truth as the one of an unconquerable and loyal Germany that was popular among the Germany that was popular among the Germans in the late 1920s and 1930s.
   
   The goal of this book is to show that picture does not correspond to reality. Believing that myth is dangerous for the country and the world.
   
   As an aside, I can speak to the ubiquity and power of this myth. I have had a couple of Russian students in the United States. Both were intelligent and worldly. One had lived in the United States for 10 years. Both were going to business schools. And each believed that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were American agents, and that the collapse of the USSR was a CIA plot. The first time I heard this I was surprised, but thought it was an aberration. The second time I heard it I was stunned.
   
   But back to Collapse of an Empire. Gaidar's basic thesis is that the economic-and hence political-collapse of the USSR was inevitable:
   
   [The collapse of the USSR] was preordained by the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet economy and political system: the institutions formed in the late 1920s and early 1930s were too rigid and did not permit the country to adapt to the challenges of world development in the late 20th century. The legacy of socialist industrialization, the anomalous defense load, the extreme crisis in agriculture, and the noncompetitive manufacturing sector made the fall of the regime inevitable. In the 1970s and early 1980s these problems could have been managed if oil prices had been high. But that was not a dependable foundation for preserving the last empire.
   
   Gaidar recounts the chronology of collapse in excruciating detail; too much detail at times for my taste, but a choice that Gaidar defends as necessary to overcome the power of the myth.
   
   Gaidar shows that agriculture was the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Stalin ruthlessly exploited agriculture to fund industrial development. This worked for awhile, but only served to demonstrate that supply curves are much more elastic in the long run than the short run. In the short run, peasants could be forced to turn over the bulk of their harvest in exchange for a pittance. In the long run, however, the attempt to extract surplus from the countryside and the necessity of attracting labor to manufacturing and megaprojects led to a flow of the best and most productive labor out of agriculture and into industry. Soviet agriculture became progressively less efficient as a result. Combine this with assorted insanities, like the virgin lands program, and what was once the world's breadbasket became a farming basketcase.
   
   Forced to import larger and larger quantities of food, but non-competitive in the production of machinery or other manufactured goods, the USSR relied on the export of oil to pay for it. With increasing oil output from rich western Siberian fields, and spiraling prices (courtesy of OPEC and declining US production), for a time the USSR was able to overcome the creeping weakness of its agriculture sector, and even go on an aggressive military and political offensive that spanned the globe. But soon declining oil production (attributable to extremely inefficient Soviet practices) and plummeting prices (courtesy of growing non-OPEC output, burgeoning Saudi production, and more efficient consumption of energy in the West) conspired to create an acute fiscal crisis in the USSR.
   
   Gaidar chronicles the results of this crisis, and the government's (and Party's) incompetence in dealing with it. The rigidity of a centrally planned system, the rudimentary nature of the financial system, the acute political constraints facing the country's leadership, and the geronocratic nature of that leadership, made it impossible to respond. Things spiraled out of control. Price controls prevented smooth adjustment to external shocks. Fear of political unrest prevented the leadership from lifting the controls. Faced with incredible strains on the budget, the government ran the printing press overtime. Partial "reform" measures, and improvident policy choices (such as the anti-alcohol campaign that deprived the government of a large share of its domestic revenues), only made things worse. In the end, everything came tumbling down.
   
   Gaidar's narrative is compelling. To a Chicago-trained economist, it is almost axiomatic that socialist system that suppresses and distorts almost every market signal; deprives individuals of the ability to make coherent economic choices; and resorts to force in an attempt to make its irrational system work; will fail in the end.
   
   To the Russians who grew up in the system, or who grew up in the aftermath of its collapse, alas, it is not so obvious. As Gaidar notes, the fall of an empire seems anything but common sense to those that lived it. Putin and the siloviki are exploiting this to the hilt, and are perpetrating the myth that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the economic and social chaos that followed this collapse was not due to the inherent defects of the Soviet economic system, but instead resulted from malign external forces. The recent "elections" indicate that large swaths of the Russian populace have fallen for this myth hook, line, and sinker.
   
   So for the present, anyways, Gaidar is doomed to play the role of Cassandra, prophesying that disaster will follow Putin's Plan, but cursed to be disbelieved and ignored. Putin and the siloviki, like the Bourbons, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They have not learned from what destroyed the Soviet Union, but have not forgotten that the Soviet Union was once a colossus before which the world trembled. They want to restore this colossus (admittedly, and happily, without all the totalitarian baggage), and are pursuing this goal relentlessly.
   
   I believe that Gaidar is right that down this path lies ruin. I fear, however, that Russia will have to find this out the hard way. So Yegor Gaidar is a prophet without honor in his own country, among his own kin, and in his own house. But I believe he is a prophet nonetheless. And I heartily recommend that you read his excellent book.



2. Professor Gaidar has done it again! He has given us another thoughtful work on Russia, yet not purely from an economic perspective- although there is lots of that in the book- but in terms of the context of history. Readers new to Gaidar would do well to get hold of his work 'State and Evolution'. This work also brilliantly examines recent of events in Russia in the context of the development of nations.
   
   I look forward to more from this man's pen. And my sincere appreciation to the Brooking Institute for making this work available in English. Possibly, with the level of interest in such a work, its sales may not be high and Broooking may be making a financial loss. But to readers like myself, I feel a great gratitude of debt to both the author and publisher.
   
   Buy this book and enjoy an intellectual feast! It is simply fantastic!



3. Yegor Gaidar's Collapse of an Empire is an insider's view of the causes and events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The author is has a fascinating and improbable background. He served as acting Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Economics Minister of Russia under Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s but is an academic economist rather than a politician or bureaucrat. He received his PhD in economics under the Soviet educational system but, somehow, developed a solid understanding of economics of free markets. In Collapse of an Empire, Gaidar offers his historical and economic perspective on the Soviet collapse as a lesson and caution for today's Russia. It is as close to a definitive work on the Soviet collapse as I have yet read.
   
   Gaidar starts with two general observations, one on empires and one on oil, and then proceeds to describe the Soviet Collapse.
   
   Empires
   
   Empires come in two flavors: Overseas empires (British, French, Dutch) and territorially contiguous empires (Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, Soviet Union, and, on a smaller scale, Yugoslavia). Of these two types, the overseas empires are the easier to dismantle: The imperial power can simply declare the former colonies free and, possibly, repatriate a limited number of colonists with a claim to citizenship in the mother country. In territorial empires, diverse ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups usually reside in close proximity to each other and often have longstanding conflicts over rights to land and under the law. Abolishing a territorial empire leaves all these conflicts in place, ready to boil over as soon as imperial control has been lifted. Members of the formerly dominant ethnic group may even find themselves a minority in one of the successor states and subject to the rule of one of their formerly subject people. Many of the troubled areas of the world today (Balkans, Middle East) are parts of former territorial empires where population segments have not succeeded in making peace with their neighbors.
   
   Oil
   
   Countries with significant natural resources, especially oil, have generally not been on the forefront of democracy or economic liberalism. Gaidar attributes this phenomenon to the steady stream of revenues the sale of oil provides the ruling party. Secured by this source of income, the government has no need to reach an accommodation with its people that gives them a voice in how they are governed. In exchange, the tax burden on the population often remains very light. The western democracies grew out of accommodations that essentially gave the people a voice in how their countries were governed in exchange for their acceptance of the government's imposition of taxes.
   
   Soviet Collapse
   
   Prior to WWI, Russia was one of the largest grain exporters in the world. In the West, industrialization followed the production of an agricultural surplus which released excess farm labor for industrial employment. Russia followed a different path after the Bolshevik revolution. Rather than building an agricultural surplus, Lenin and Stalin seized the grain and other agricultural products of the countryside to feed the urban and industrial populations. Simultaneously, they reallocated labor from agriculture to industry to support their goal of rapid industrialization. The result was an economic and human disaster. Soviet agriculture never recovered, never produced a sustained surplus, and the country became dependent on imported grain. (See Robert Conquest's Harvest of Sorrow for details). By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest grain importer.
   
   At that time (the 1970s), the Soviets were able to pay for their grain imports by exporting oil. This was the time of high oil prices and the Arab embargo on oil exports to the US. Grain prices were low, so Soviet trade balanced nicely: Expensive exports, inexpensive imports.
   
   In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran. These events led the Saudis to become concerned about a Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf and a threat to their kingdom. To counter this perceived threat, in the mid 1980s the Saudis greatly expanded their production and export of oil causing the world price to drop from the $30-40/bbl range to about $10/bbl. Obviously, this price change damaged the Soviet balance of trade.
   
   At about the same time (mid 1980s), the world price of grain shot up significantly. This further damaged the Soviet trade balance.
   
   If this wasn't enough, the volume of Soviet oil production declined in the late 1980s for two reasons. First, to generate foreign exchange, oil production had been focused on the most productive fields which were exploited at a rate that was harmful to the long-term productivity of the fields. Second, the reduced availability of foreign exchange and the continuing requirement to import grain led the Soviet government to reduce imports of industrial materials from the West, including equipment for oil drilling, production, and transport.
   
   By 1989, food subsidies constituted a third of the Soviet national budget. Retail prices were fixed at artificially low levels, which was one form of subsidy. At the same time, the Soviet government was subsidizing the import and domestic production of food. The costs of producing or importing food were as much as 70% higher than the retail prices. With a net outflow of hard currency and a grossly imbalanced domestic budget, the only way to "pay" the government's bills was to print more rubles. With prices fixed by the state, the resulting inflation could only result in shortages at the retail level and a huge increase in individual "savings" since there was nothing for the population to buy with its rubles. By 1991, of 1200 officially recognized consumer goods, 1150 were not readily available.
   
   Declining credit-worthiness drove most western commercial banks to refuse to make further loans to the Soviet government, leaving Gorbachev with only the option of begging for foreign aid from the capitalist governments. Gaidar even suggests that he made the following deal with George H. W. Bush at their Malta conference in 1989: In exchange for US financial assistance, the Soviet government will refrain from using force to maintain its control of its Eastern European satellites.
   
   Throughout its 70+ years of existence, the mantra of the Soviet government and the Communist Party had been that The Party had a special role in the Soviet system because of its unique "wisdom", its understanding of communist economics and the Soviet man. By the late 1980s, the Russian people and even the Soviet bureaucracy knew that this was a lie. However, the inertia of the system did not allow The Party to admit it's "wisdom" had been wrong and that a major economic reform based on free markets was desperately needed.
   
   By revealing the true history of the Soviet Union (e.g., the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), Glasnost destroyed any lingering myth of the legitimacy of the Soviet Empire. In the end, the Empire could only be maintained by force, but the use of that force would have ended any hope for financial aid from the West.
   
   The August 1991 coup was only the farce that followed the tragedy that constituted the history of the Soviet Union.



4. The other reviews allready tells you what you need to know about the very good analysis this good provides about the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to give a comprehensive understanding of what happened the writer also manages to put new light on common assumptions. For instance he illustrates that Gorbachev's huge unpopularity among many Russians is rather unfair, as any Soviet leader in his position would have to make many of the same decissions. He illustrates that one should be careful before jumping to conclusions about Gorbachev's democratic and open policies as these policy was an absolute condition for getting political loans - the only type of credit that the Soviet Union was able to get in the 2nd half of the 80s.
   
   The book has two mayor weeknesses in my view. First, the book gets too unfocused as a result of first telling a story about why autoritarian empires tends to collaps and why and how oildominated economies tends to experience certain problems, before he starts on the story about the downfall of the Soviet Union. This could be made much shorter, clearer and integrated in the actual story. If he wants to write a story about the problem all the world's oil economies experiences, the sensible way to do this is to write another book about it. This weekness is not very important as you can skip these chapters if you want to read about what what is written on the cover - the collapse of an empire.
   
   A more serious problem is that the writer is like a sales man that keeps giving you new arguments for his product, even though you are convinced and are ready to buy. Sometimes less is more - a few tables can illustrate the point better than 600 tables that by no means is equally informative. Include 1 or 2 quotes where it offers a clear added value to the writer's own text. It is not necesary to add several quotes of varying informative value to virtually every argument. This is a more serious problem as it more difficult to skip the quotes or tables that is not very interesting without reading all of them.
   
   All in all though, for anyone interested in the Soviet Union and its collapse, this books provides an uniqe insight - even insights that can give new insight into other books about the same subject.

No comments about Unbearable Cost: Bush, Greenspan and the Economics of Empire.

5 comments about Mr. China: A Memoir.

1. Although he certainly never intended it as such (MR.CHINA is subtitled "A Memoir" and has a target audience of gung ho, wanna-get-rich-investing-in-China business types) this is probably the most accurate and the most devastating portrayal of authentic Chinese culture since Bo Yang's THE UGLY CHINAMAN. For those looking at becoming better aquainted with Chinese business culure, or more precisely: Chinese business ethics, here's a free starter lesson:
   
   There aren't any.
   
   Foreigners shouldn't take this personally. The Chinese have been cheating each other as a matter of course for centuries. What's more, they have been so poor and so oppressed for so long that they will go to nearly any extent in order to make their bundle and head for the hills. In Taipei, Taiwan, in which I live and in which there is a free press, there are an immoderate number of newspaper articles that mirror the anecdotes conveyed by Tim Clissord in what is a very enthralling book. Scheming, swindling, duplicity, and general dishonesty are deeply, deeply ingrained aspects of the national psyche in China. And so, when some hopelessly niave Westerner waltzes into town with a suitcase full of cash and a bunch lofty ideas concerning efficiency and profit sharing, then, well, if the stars didn't just align.
   
   "Nonsense," cries the next Mr. China (a sentiment echoed in some of these reviews) "I'm a trained lawyer." Fine, but you'll have to bribe the anti-corruption officials just to open up dialogue. "If I got suspicious of my Chinese partner, I'd have funds frozen." Great, if the bank manager (who might very well be your partner's cousin) hasn't emptied the vaults and flown to Hawaii. "My factory in Guangzhou is humming along just fine." For now, but are you sure the land title hasn't been transferred, or the managers haven't used your money to build an identical plant across town? "My business partner is a man of integrity." Read the book.
   
   There's a hitch to getting rich in China. Each and every one of the people you will have to deal with has the exact same idea.
   
   Troy Parfitt, author



2. Tim Clissold's Mr. China provides an excellent view of how business was done in China in the nineties, and how rapidly China was building out through that period. It also provides background on common business and negotiating strategies used by Chinese JV partners in the period before China joined the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 2001 at the Doha round.
   
   Tim provides one view of the deals, while Jack Perkowski's book, Managing the Dragon: How I'm Building a Billion-Dollar Business in China, provides a different perspective. Perkowski is the Wall Street investment banker mentioned in Mr. China.
   
   As someone who lives and works in China, I can attest to the truth of the many frustrations mentioned in the book. The trouble comes when westerners try to force change on the Chinese at a pace of the westerners' choosing. The change is picking up speed, but only because the change is coming from within the China, and not being forced by external pressure.
   
   Through it all, the author comes through as someone who although occasionally frustrated with his Chinese business associates, has a deep respect and affection for the Chinese people. This comes through in the final paragraph of the book:
   
   "If by writing this book I can make the Chinese people seem more human, less mysterious or threatening, just flawed and beautiful like us, then the troubles of the past ten years have been worthwhile."



3. This is a highly entertaining story of the early days of investing in China when every entrepreneur was trying to make as fast a buck as possible. Those were truely wild west days and they have largely passed but they make very useful reading for anyone investing there as it was not that long ago.



4. Mr. China, with great humor, is what happens when direct investors become infatuated with (1) the 'development potential' of a stable, intelligent, resource-laden emerging market country (particularly a communist one) and (2) their own messiah-like potential to bequeath prosperity to the country's impoverned people. With a terribly poor understanding of Chinese law enforcement, politics/communism, culture and very limited Chinese relationships, they begin rapidly investing in China eager to beat others to the punch. Inevitably they learn that (1) 'controlling investor' entails more than 51% equity ownership, (2) only enforceable rules count, (3) rules aren't enforceable unless you're better connected to the CCP, (4) communism isn't just a theory; it's a lifestyle, (5) if you are a well-intentioned humanist on the inside but look/act like a reincarnated imperialist, guess what people see, and (6) yes, all the normal precautions of private equity investing in fact cannot be ignored for the sake of speed, culture or quasi-charity.
   
   Great read for anyone interested in direct investing / business management in China or simply emerging markets in general.



5. "Mr. China" is a collection of vignettes of real-life misadventures by Wall Street in its drive to invest and profit from China's production abilities in the 1990's; attempts to make profit from investing in the "one billion three." Here, the author is the first person protagonist as he tries to supervise his many venture factories.
   
   Every possible disaster ensued: flooding; national economic downturns; international incidents. Personnel problems topped the list. The Chinese directors manage to do everything possible to sink their own ships perhaps while making new ones: resist modern efficiency; embezzle; set up competing businesses; spend millions on fruitless unauthorized enterprises and to play the government and the courts against their foreign partners. The disasters drove the author, via stress, to near death.
   
   The book is an effort to convey and to understand what happened. The surprising conclusion of the book is that the author believes the business mismatch of East and West, when looked at from the Chinese perspective, shows, in fact, the strength of the Chinese character: in times of trouble, to look to the short term and seize advantage when offered. In the end the author became life long friends with many of his adversaries.
   
   The book seemed long on disasters and short on solid insight. But the book can serve well as a cautionary tale to today's investors in China's industries.

5 comments about Multinational Business Finance (11th Edition) (The Addison-Wesley Series in Finance).

1. This book gives plenty of background into international finance. Unfortunately, it has some big flaws, in my opinion. First, there are not enough calculation examples. Second, there are too few questions at the end of each chapter. In addition, you must go to the author's website for the solution. Once you get there, you will be surprised to find out that the author has only solved maybe two out of eight problems. That's annoying. I do not recommend this book. Take a class from another professor who uses a different text book.



2. This book has cursory overview of everthing and lacks detail. Also, each chapter starts well to get you excited on what you are going to learn and at the end of each chapter, you can't really tell whether it addressed the topics in enough details to give you the necessary understanding.



3. Too much money for a useless book!!!!
   
   I strongly agree with the two reviews previous to mine. The book gets you interested at the begining, but let you down afterwards. It has little depth in the topics and many flaws when comes to explaining things. In exemple, the "Fisher Effect" was never explained, but all the book gives you is the formula. There is little explanation about the components and variables in the formulas. So, you have to rely heavily on your instructor.
   
   There are almost no calculation examples and use of formulas. The teory in the book is not well explained either. So, you get more confused. That in my opinion is because the authors did not spend enough time to present the material clearly and the editors did not review and edit the book to increase the readability and comprehension. To illustrate what I am talking about, there is a lot of white space in the book (implies it lacks substance) and the text refers to graphs or charts shown in one/two pages before or after. Compared to other finance books I had in the past, this whole book looks like a compilation of bad summary sections.
   
   In conclusion, it was not worth the money. It got me confused and wasted my time. In case you have to use it because it is mandatory, rely on your notes and instrutor's lectures.



4. The book came so quickly and was in the condition it was described, good with minimal highlighting. Very happy with it



5. Multinational Business Finance (11th Edition) (The Addison-Wesley Series in Finance) The book isn't that good for a Finance course, but the seller was very prompt with shipping product after recieving payment.

1 comments about The Globalization Reader.

1. The editors put together an impressive pedigree of authors of the book's chapters. Foremost amongst these is Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations. He discusses how modern states still have a place in this era of increasing globalisation. Then Nobelist Amartya Sen asks how to judge its successes and failures. He suggests that it has much to offer. But also cautions that multinationals often prefer working in autocracies than in free wheeling democracies. And globalisation tends to deal in spreading capitalism rather than democracy.
   
   Historian Samuel Huntington, philosopher Hans Kung and many others also give variant takes. More optimistic, though with qualifications.
   
   You can ponder the essays as posing more thoughtful and measured views than many shrill screeds on the subject.

1 comments about Money Meltdown.

1. First, the only reason I did not give this 5 stars is because I think the book could have been more concise. I don't fault Ms Shelton for this as much as I do her editor.
   
   That said, her points are well made. She starts off with the "Legacy of Bretton Woods". Then discusses (at length) both what conditions were like in many of the countries at the time as well as what went wrong and why Nixon finally removed this country from the modified gold standard of Bretton Woods (by the way, Paul Volker was heavily involved with this decision according to Shelton.) I for one appreciated the well documented, scholarly history lesson.
   
   The 4th chapter titled "Theory vs Reality" discusses 4 currency theories: dirty float, pegged rates, hard currency and private currency. She discusses strengths and weaknesses of all the systems.
   
   The book concludes with recommendations. She covers both what she thinks is the best monetary system and how to implement it. I won't tell you what she suggests. But I'll say this - the book was last updated in 1998, and given what has happened (I'm writing this in Nov. 2008) since that time, it's too bad the powers that be, didn't listen to this lady.

5 comments about Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education.

1. Derek Bok, a professor and formerly president of Harvard, writes about the pressures for commercialization that institutions of higher education face and are likely to face in the future. (Commercialization is defined as "efforts within the university to make profit from teaching, research and other campus activities.") In particular, Professor Bok has taken on three major themes: commercialization of athletics, research and education (online teaching, extension programs, etc.)

   For one, this book is a useful reality check. Through scores of studies, Professor Bok dispels the myth that these three activities are profitable. Save few exceptions, these endeavors prove financially disastrous. More than that, there are the hidden dangers of compromising a university's academic standards and standing in the community. The call for a candid evaluation of the costs of commercialization is half of the book's theme.

   The other half outlines prescriptions and guidelines for university presidents about how to handle these increased pressures. Professor Bok suggests revision to NCAA rules, and university oversight and care to limit the influence of corporate sponsors over research or the curriculum taught in schools.

   In the end, "Universities in the Marketplace" is a reminder that universities are built around values: "the larger message of a liberal arts education [is] that there is more to life than making money." These values and the collaborative spirit, on which universities thrive, are threatened by the mistaken perception that there is money to be made by exploiting a school's name. The adherence to high standards is an old prescription for new pressures, and the one that Professor Bok suggests as the ultimate guideline for dealing with the threats of the future.




2. Anyone who has been associated with higher education in this country in the last fifty years is aware of the massive changes that have been sweeping over private colleges and state university systems in the last twenty to thirty years, changes ranging from the unfortunate consequences of political correctness to those associated with a relaxation of more rigorous academic standards to make such education "more accessible" to the population at large to other changes associated with the increasing concentration on more practical "vocational" educational skills to the proliferation of shop-as-you-go graduate educational programs, diploma mills designed to deliver to consumers a plethora of MBA and other business-oriented degrees in service to their career progression. Those of us professionally associated with higher education have often bemoaned the sad changes visiting themselves upon what was once a proud institution, the marvel of the western world in terms of its level of rigor, accessibility, and relative merit in terms of educational product.

   In this recent tome by former Harvard University president Derek Bok, yet another form of change and devolution of all the academy once stood for is discussed with both intelligence and wit; the commercialization of institutions of higher education and the associated seduction and corruption of faculty, administrators and the university system itself. Bok takes a probing look at the many ways in which financial enticements have entered the ivory towers, and how such temptations are profoundly altering the business of the university system itself, often warping both the mission of the institution as well as the intellectual products flowing from the academic marketplace. Beginning with the advent of financial gain associated with college sport programs, the author wonders out loud at what point the transformation of what was once an ancillary concern for additional source of academic funding became a much more purposeful source of university profit, resulting in much more deliberate efforts on the university's part to use sport for financial gain.

   He similarly muses over the fashion in which independent medical research efforts within university setting have become captive to the driving force of pharmaceutical and other medical enterprises, such that the focus and progress of medical research becomes much more focused on particular kinds of patent-driven and/or profit-oriented enterprises, efforts that if successful can turn humble medical researchers into instant millionaire tycoons. Similarly, universities now find themselves competing over intellectual hot properties like cybernetic wiz-kids, with places like Harvard offering fringe benefits like free homes in Concord or Lexington MA in order to lure promising young computer superstars capable of drawing a lot of grant money and/or corporate sponsorship to the institution. Finally, he debates as to what the practice of beginning such internet-based distance learning programs will have on both the quality and nature of higher education in the future, since it could well have significant consequences for those wishing to actually do their study on-campus.

   Of course, commercialization has some positive aspects to it, as with the excellent (and quietly profit-oriented) extension university system associated with Harvard. One can gain access to the same faculty and coursework as is available in the full-time day programs at Harvard in part-time evening programs (both undergraduate as well as graduate) that are relatively inexpensive, have few entrance requirements and all of the advantages of a more rigorous Harvard liberal arts education. While it is likely true that the program exists as a way of Harvard itself cashing in on the cache of its name, it offers a quality educational program and provides a potential excellent product for a discerning consumer. At base, this is an absorbing book, one well worth the time and effort to thread through its 200 some pages in search of some provocative and thoughtful observations of the drawbacks associated with the increasing commercialization of the university marketplace. It is a book I can highly recommend. Enjoy!




3. Derek Bok does a respectful job in describing the issues. The book provides an excellent foundation for the general public to understand the influence of commercialization on higher education. Higher education is big business in the United States. The book's relevance to issues related to intercollegiate athletics, higher education research, online delivery of education and other influences on academics is necessary to understanding the impact of commercialization, both positive and adverse, on higher education today.
   I found the book to be interesting, yet somewhat limited in that often the book was repetitive and the ideas shared were fairly obvious examples and too narrow in scope. When the book was published in 2003, online education far surpassed some of the descriptions provided by the author. To suggest that one online class could cost one million dollars to develop is overstated and many of the examples of the type of pedagogy in online education were naïve and not current. Also, all Division I college athletic programs are not administered as Bok describes. He over generalizes when suggesting that admission standards at universities are lowered to accommodate student athletes. This is not always the case.
   Certainly Derek Bok's credentials speak for themselves, but it appears that in writing this book, additional research and new ideas could have been presented.



4. Former Harvard University President Derek Bok warns that making commercial ventures part of the fabric of U.S. higher education endangers universities' basic values and goals. However, he also gives compelling descriptions of why trustees and administrators are tempted to sign deals with corporations. He is realistic about the slim prospects for keeping such ventures away, especially since some - like sports teams - are already entrenched. Because Bok's analysis is so deeply rooted in his years of experience leading Harvard, his proposed guidelines for how and when to allow big business on campus are particularly helpful. His views are occasionally unwarrantedly sunny, such as when he avers that faculty members rarely guide students into work that promotes the teacher's financial gain. He also asserts that faculty must be wary of collaborating with pharmaceutical companies to get access to facilities and materials, even though funding unfettered research has become increasingly difficult. Furthermore, after asserting that doctors are alert to drug companies' promotions in sponsored continuing education courses, he acknowledges research showing that doctors who attend such courses are more likely to prescribe the companies' drugs. Despite such detours, we find this book extremely valuable for anyone who believes that academic freedom and integrity truly matter. Academic leaders should read Bok's important, thoughtful and useful ideas on ways that colleges can minimize the risks of commercialization.



5. Great book with real life examples about higer education, capitalism, and marketplace. Quick and easy read.