No comments about Urban Regeneration in Europe (Real Estate Issues).

No comments about The Communist Manifesto: With Related Documents (The Bedford Series in History and Culture).

2 comments about The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist 1843-1993.

1. "The pursuit of reason" is a detailled and excellent written history of the Economist.It's the answer to the question:HOW CAN A BUSINESS MAGAZINE SURVIVE FOR MORE THAN 150 YEARS? The answer of this book is: quality goes never out of style.A must for every economist who loves his job.



2. This is one of those books which seeks to impress its own authority with thousands of references. As my father worked at The Economist for nearly 40 years, I have met several of its characters and yet when I read Ruth's book it's like meeting different people. With nearly 1000 pages, I soon lost interest in reading everyone serially as even the reason for economics does not come through the way I believe founder James Wilson intended.
   
   Unless the index is itself porous, try a few tests. The one reference to Calcutta does not explain this is where James Wilson died before his time trying to bring ethics to the British Raj. There is no reference to the word entrepreneur even though this is one of the keywords that journalists from The Economist systemically embedded in economics intent on the reasoning that economics - and its compound consequences - should be used to truly and fairly represent all people, and not just the big get bigger.
   
   It would be a pity if The Economist loses its culture and values because of a tome that does not live its founders DNA. Especially in the coming decade where economics itself needed to be transformed (according to The Economist's 1980s future history scenarios) if we are to earn future sustainability of our species. We are hurtling through a series of tipping points of the post-industrial age where it is high time for economics to help all of us unite in confronting inconvenient truths and the corrupted systems that courageous grassroots networkers at Transparency International bear witness to. You will not find such tensely vital neighbours as globalization or micro in the index. So presumably no valuetrue debate on which way round the triangle "micro to inter to macro economics" needs to be mapped if every society and global village network is to be cross-culturally sustainable in the way we all invest in markets - and their networking gatesway to freedom and happiness.
   
   Reasoning needs, now more than ever, to be about open maps from and to diverse destinations, not a uniform managerial mindset carved in Harvardian stone and resembling the dinosaur's world view.

5 comments about Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy.

1. This is the book for anyone with a sense of placement (or the struggling lack thereof) and a taste for living history, but it's also a mandatory text for the market economists who predicted in 1990 that the former Soviet Union would be once again on top of the world by the 21st century, economically speaking. After all, many argued, they had 80 years to sit by and scrutinize, study, and learn from the mistakes of the other capitalist states that bumped, lurched, and stumbled along. But, as Heller once wrote, "something happened along the way..."

   The book opens up with a brief history of the Russian (then Soviet, then Russian again) people; their track record of reform and reaction. The next chapters explore theories behind pure capitalism versus pure democracy; presidents versus parliaments; dependency and co-existence throughout the entire planet; the many forms of nationalism throughout the expanding Russian national consciousness; and finally, the often painful consequences of economic globalization.

   Further, we begin to explore what would become the collapse of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's attempts at reformation and his apparent "capitalistic" frame of mind (to the chagrin of his CPSU handlers, from whom these leanings had been well-hidden, and for good reason). The true heart of the book, however, opens with Yeltsin's "economic revolution" in 1991 (or '92, depending on where you lived). The economic revolution, the authors feel, helped stave off what would have certainly been a political revolution for purer democracy - the nomenklatura had yet to provide any real reforms other than the opening and immediate snapping shut of the window on democracy that was Glasnost. Unfortunately, Yeltsin's political and economic advisers had their sights set on higher aims, and weren't necessarily providing the soundest of information. Further, it would appear that they felt Boris was nothing more than a stepping stone, that the global public would soon tire of his drunken shenanigans, and would have him disposed of far more easily (and quickly, and permanently) than his predecessor.

   The cultural and moral decay brought about by Yeltsin's attempts at moving cabinet members around like pawns on a chess board are spelled out vividly. The authors feel, however, that the situation is not beyond hope, and present evidence to support this claim.

   The reader should approach this book not as a sympathetic driver cruising along the highway, slowing down just enough to cast a furtive glance at a crash victim, then to speed up and leave the accident scene in the rear-view mirror. There comes a time when the driver should pull over and offer what assistance can be provided, no matter what the immediate cost. The rewards (whether spiritual, moral, or financial - that's up to the driver to decide) will be monumental.




2. This book is a polemical diatribe against Boris Yeltsin and reformist politicians who worked for him. While parts of it contain fair summaries of political events, the analysis is entirely one-dimensional, seeking to blame Yeltsin and his policies for all RussiaÕs problems.

   The authors make the typical mistake of assuming that economic transformation in Russia began in the 1990s. They make no mention of GorbachevÕs economic reforms, and apparently believe that central planning was still working right up until the early 1990s. They show no understanding of the Soviet economy or the reasons for its disintegration in the 1980s. Instead they blame everything on subsequent market reforms, though they show no real knowledge of what these reforms were.

   Attempts to blame all RussiaÕs problems on economic reformers would be more convincing if they had not been forced out of the government every few months. In fact throughout the Yeltsin period Russian governments were dominated not by "young reformers" but by old-style Soviet industrialists, who also retained power in Russia's regions.

   But the authors are not interested in such subtleties. Instead they rely on old cliches, such as the myth of "shock therapy" in Russia. In fact attempts to introduce Polish-style monetary policies were thwarted by corrupt beneficiaries of the status quo. As a result, the first half of the 1990s was characterised by hyperinflation. More than anything else, this failure to reform plunged RussiaÕs population into desperate poverty.

   Economic reforms in Russia have been slow and partial in comparison with most east European countries, which have successfuly made a transition to a market economy. But the authors do not make any attempt to put Russian reforms in an international context. A comparison with Ukraine or Belarus would discredit the idea that post-Soviet problems were primarily caused by rash market reforms. A comparison with Estonia Ð the fastest-growing economy in the former Soviet Union Ð would show the effects of single-minded commitment to economic liberalism.

   The alternatives the authors present completely lack substance. There is a vague reference to "dismantling central planning gradually" Ð a policy that was tried for several years during the 1980s, with disastrous consequences. But the authors Ð political scientists rather than economists Ð are not particularly interested in economic analysis, and opt for simple stereotypes about RussiaÕs economy and economic policies.

   Unfortunately their political analysis is equally full of holes. They argue that the "Soviet middle class" could have provided the base for a political alternative Ð as if a few college professors could take on the combined weight of the Communist and post-Comunist nomenklatura (ironically the authors accuse Russian reformers of unrealistic thinking). Incredibly, the authors refer approvingly to the KGB as one of the "less corrupt institutions of the establishment". They are obviously unaware of the KGBÕs role in the mass theft of state property during the late Gorbachev period.

   There are plenty of much better books on post-Soviet Russia. A good starting point is Thane GustafsonÕs "Capitalism: Russian-Style", which offers a balanced and well-researched description of RussiaÕs economic reforms.




3. Yes, it's right, Anders Aslund, former advisor to the Russian Government under Yeltsin, took quotes out of context from Reddaway and Glinski's book in a futile attempt to paint Reddaway, perhaps the most prominent authority in the world on the Soviet dissident movement and the abuse of psychiatric hospitals under the Soviet regime, and Glinski, a prominent figure in the democratic movement in Russia, as fascists...in any case, this book is by far the best that has been written telling the truth of Boris Yeltsin's tragic turn to the right -- to the mafiya and to old figures in the Soviet nomenklatura, and the accompanying turn away from the democratic movement which brought him to power.

   This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to go beyond the pronouncements of the American foreign policy establishment that Russia is on the road to democracy and learn what really happened.




4. By applying structural methodology, the authors have in this book managed to disentangle and address a plethora of important issues attached to the transitional phase of the Russian modernisation. The principal claim of shock therapy being an outcome of the "democracy-capitalism" dichotomy is plausibly supported and illuminated by evidence proving the unsuitably pervasive influence of external institutions such as the IMF, coupled with presidential authoritarianism. The analysis accumulates considerable propensity and dynamic when the authors address the Western `ready made, assumptions of social phenomena such as nationalism, democracy and populist movements. It delivers an insight of the intricacies inherent in the social structure. Although the authors attempt to remain largely impartial and empirical in their study, the reader cannot fail to get the feeling that the line of arguments, at times, is too one-dimensioned towards Yeltsin and the IMF. It would add more substance to the study, had the authors incorporated a wider discussion of the international dimension. I do largely agree with the author's criticism towards Yeltsin when they argue that the presidential institution enjoyed the decree to choose a more suitable path to economic modernisation. Moreover, I concur that there was a link between Yeltsin's domestic powers and the unconditional international support he enjoyed. This is not to say that external moods could or ought to have played a decisive role in shaping the future of Russia, but it should no doubt, in hindsight, have favoured the emergence of a civil society before the market. The authors have throughout the book pointed out several missed opportunities for a genuine democratic movement to take root. With Yeltsin out of the political circus, it remains to be seen if Putin will eventually allow the democratic forces in Russia, to infiltrate the socio-political layers and by so doing; put an end to another protracted and pernicious era in Russian history. I highly recommend this book for those who wish to understand Russia's place in today's and tomorrows economically globalised world.



5. Peter Reddaway (George Washington University Washington, DC) und Dmitri Glinski (Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen Moskau) legen mit dieser voluminösen Studie der postsowjetischen russischen Reformversuche nicht nur die bisher bei weitem fundierteste Kritik des Reformkurses der Jelzin-Regierung vor. Sie steuern mit diesem Buch auch eine besonders detaillierte, fakten- und quellengesättigte Beschreibung der turbulenten Ereignisse im Rußland der 1990er sowie eine umfassende Interpretation dieses Jahrzehnts im Kontext der gesamten russischen Geschichte bei. Dieses Buch scheint dafür prädestiniert zu sein, sich zu einem Standardwerk zu Jelzins Herrschaft zu entwickeln.
   Aufgrund der Vielzahl der Ereignisse, Tendenzen, Theorien und Konzepte, die Reddaway und Glinski hier vorstellen, werden Rezensenten ganz verschiedene Aspekte erwähnenswert finden.
   Reddaways und Glinskis Konzipierung und Verwendung des Bolschewismusbegriffs ist in diesem Zusammenhang durchaus einer ernsthaften Beachtung wert. Besteht - trotz aller offensichtlichen ideologischen Gegensätze zwischen den Bolschewiki des beginnenden und radikalen Reformern des ausgehenden 20. Jahrhunderts - womöglich tatsächlich eine strukturelle Ähnlichkeit im Gesellschaftsbild, Selbstverständnis und der Transformationsstrategie beider Gruppierungen? Viele Beobachter - so auch dieser - würden eine derartige Gleichstellung zunächst ablehnen. Nach der Lektüre des Buches stellt sich jedoch die Sinnhaftigkeit eines Vergleichs beider Strömungen nicht mehr als so abwegig dar (wenn auch eine pauschale Gleichstellung weiterhin ungerechtfertigt erscheint). Zumindest ist festzustellen, daß die Ereignisse der 1990er als eine Revolution und die "Reformer" als Revolutionäre zu betrachten sind. Auch läßt sich eine gewisse Arroganz im öffentlichen Auftreten solcher Männer wie Anatolij Cubais, Boris Fëdorov oder Egor Gajdar sowie der dubiose, ja destruktive Charakter bestimmter "Reformschritte", insbesondere der Privatisierung einiger Filetstücke der russischen Industrie nach dem "Kredite für Aktien"-Schema, nicht bestreiten. Zudem können einige Figuren im Lager der "Reformer", wie etwa der berüchtigte, später als Stabschef der Union Rechter Kräfte fungierende Alfred Koch, wohl kaum als wirkliche Demokraten bezeichnet werden. Ebenso erscheinen die teilweise ambivalenten Stellungnahmen einiger als "Westler" geltender Politiker zum Tschetschenienabenteuer des konservativen Teils der Jelzinadministration als alarmierend. Nicht zuletzt machen Reddaway und Glinski zu Recht darauf aufmerksam, daß das Verhältnis zwischen freier Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie keineswegs so eineindeutig ist, wie es viele russische "Refomer" sowie einige westliche Kommentatoren den einfachen Russen glauben machen wollten. Ob dies und einige weitere Aspekte der Reformversuche der 1990er ausreichend sind, um von einem "Marktbolschewismus" der "Reformer" der verschiedenen Jelzinregierungen zu sprechen, wird der Leser für sich entscheiden müssen. Die Fülle von Reddaways und Glinskis Argumenten stimmt zumindest nachdenklich.
   Wie wohl viele Leser, ist auch dieser Rezensent mit einer ganzen Reihe von Reddaways und Glinskis Bewertungen und Aussagen bezüglich der Gründe für die Schmerzhaftigkeit beziehungsweise das teilweise Scheitern der Reformen nicht einverstanden. Trotzdem scheint mir das Buch ein wertvoller Beitrag zu sein, weicht es doch auf erfrischende, ja manchmal provokative Art und Weise vom sogenannten "Washington-Konsensus" ab. Obwohl sich Reddaway und Glinski mit ihren Angriffen auf viele westliche Beobachter und ihrer unverblümten Verurteilung einer ganzen Reihe im Westen bislang hoch angesehener russischer "Reformer" nur wenig Freunde machen werden, kann den Autoren schon jetzt dazu gratuliert werden, einen der bislang markantesten Beiträge zur Diskussion um die russischen Reformen gemacht zu haben.

No comments about Property Rights and Economic Reform in China.

5 comments about The Redneck Manifesto.

1. No matter what your political views, social situation or racial back ground this book is sure to offend. It reads like a rant and he spins facts to his own agenda (just like the media he expouses against)but is surprisingly well written and entertaining, I would recommend this book to anyone that likes to have their own views challenged.



2. While the book is a bit difficult to read in places due to the language that Goad uses to bring his point across, it's an important book. It's basically an explanation of how poor whites are the only people in the United States that it is perfectly ok to discriminate against and slur racially. Make no mistake about it - white trash, redneck, hillbilly, etc - are all racial epithets just like those used for blacks, hispanics, asians, jews, etc. There is also historical information inside that will shock quite a few people.
   
   If you can handle the language without taking offense and understand that it's used to make a point, I highly recommend this book.



3. Jim Goad's title says it all: his book is an excellent defense of "white trash", "renecks", "crackers" and all those who find some small part of themselves in alliance with these despised characters, who are often ironically viewed, in their economic powerlessness and social marginalization, as the most convenient proof of a massive system of institutionalized white racism. With his powerful and incisive wisecrackin' wit, Goad punctures such highfalutin' dopey elite white liberal ideas: "They simultaneously depict white trash to be dumb as oak sap, yet able to pull off an intercontinental conspiracy that enslaved most of the melanin-rich world." Goad argues that the real oppressor in America as elsewhere is not white trash, white racism or white people generally, but corporations and the rich. "The 358 billionaires currently on earth are sitting on more booty than is owned by nearly half the world's population combined...it ain't about skin, it's about class." He punctures holes in the dopey and dishonest use of the term "racist" in our culture, a term which has come to be so abused and misused, applied so loosely and manipulatively and with such hypocrisy and double standards, that it no longer really means anything. Forbes magazine editor Peter Brimelow once said that "the new definition of racist means anyone winning an argument with a liberal", and Goad counters that the question "Are you a racist?" is "about as quantifiable a question as 'Are you a witch?' By whose definition?" Perhaps my favorite of all Jim Goad's wisecrackin' smartass common sense comments is this: "Black pride good. Hispanic pride good. Asian pride good....White pride bad...I didn't even WANT to be white until you told me I couldn't." Jim Goad's book is an excellent tool for those of the white persuasion (and their friends!) who feel that current politics and PC nonsense has left us with ever less psychological and cultural space that we are allowed to live within. If you want to enjoy some butt-kickin' thinkin' that'll help you "get your space back" while giving nonwhite people back their own stuff that they've unfairly been burdening you with, by all means check out this book.



4. Buy this book--I'm sure Goad could really use the royalty money these days--and read it. It's worthwhile. It's funny. It's chock-full of facts that contradict the rosy mythology/American history you and I were taught in elementary school...and the presentation is much more entertaining than similar content proffered by folks such as Ron Takaki.
   
   Goad is an ornery, three-deviations-to-the-right-of-the-mean sort, and the scion of a lower-middle-class family. If his father had been a wealthy burgher (instead of a plumber), he might very well have gone the Bill Ayers rich-boy revolutionary route. Thank God he didn't...had he done so, he'd never have written this cri de coeur--which would be a shame.
   
   Jim Goad understands the deal. He knows the score. He sees the forest AND the trees. But he's not calling for a revolution, even though I doubt he'd be sorry to witness one. What he IS calling is "BS" on the tissue of nonsense that supports the entrenched power structures--of both the right and the left. Both groups have demonized and manipulated the white working-class for their own purposes for hundreds of years...and Goad is SICK OF IT.
   
   He's an orthodoxy-buster. A received "wisdom"-defiler. A little guy who is for the little guy. A guy who knows it's all f'ed up, and ALSO knows that--human beings being what they are, along with the implications of the bell curve--it's not going to change any time soon.
   
   He's also a damned good writer. Stylistically, Goad has a penchant for hyphenates and apocope (especially for the "g" in the "-ing" suffix...to up the "homespun" factor); a predilection for wordplay (alliteration, assonance, and all other forms beloved by Irishmen); and a tendency to CAPITALIZE words in order to denote some special significance or emphasis. (I do the same thing.) He also has a great (and indispensable for this work) sense of humor, and more of his attempts at being funny are successful than not.
   
   (Jim, if you're reading this--and I bet you do read your reviews--I'll give you one typo. It occurs in my paperback copy of TRM purchased brand new from Atomic Pop in Baltimore. Page ninety-eight, third paragraph, third sentence: "...West Virginia has a lower violent-crime rates [sic]...")
   
   The last thing I'll say is that this book is not the work of a bigot. Is Goad a racist? We're ALL racists. Is Goad prejudiced? We're ALL prejudiced. Would Goad treat someone poorly SOLELY based on the color of his or her skin? I believe the answer to that is "no," and if you read this book, you will, I think, come to the same conclusion.



5. I gave this book to my dad as a present, and he threw it away. He is a voracious reader, and I thought he'd like the alternate historical perspective on how the powers that be (PTB) have systematically made the poor white working underclass, villains. He is rather new age, and I doubt that he much cares for his common "Plebian" roots, I suppose he cares more for the astral plane than social commentary. I thought he'd at least find it interesting, but I guess not. Possibly he was offended and thought it was too 'politically incorrect.' Which it is. It is angry, it is to-the-point. It is a seething work of energy, but like a college term paper, it cites specific examples and backs up it's thesis with an aftertaste of bitter.
   
   I recommend this book to anyone and everyone who is proud of their "white trash" (lower caucasian working class) heritage! This book is a fascinating insight into the motivations, frustrations, and how mainstream society has mocked and mistreated the average "redneck." Warning: this book is not "political correct," it uses very harsh language and boy is it angry! I wouldn't recommend it to anyone under the age of 18. -M. R. ;)

5 comments about Gray Dawn: How the Coming Age Wave Will Transform America--and the World.

1. In follow up to my skeptical, first review of Mr Peterson's "Gray Doom", I researched the total population numbers. Here are the facts. According to the US Census Bureau, in 1999 the median age is 35.5 and the mean age is 36.4. In 2030, when the "Peterson crisis" hits, the median age will be 38.5 and the mean age will be 39.9. Yes, our total population will be older but I have a hard time getting too alarmed over 3 years. In fact, if wisdom comes with age, maybe our "older" society will be better. I think Mr. Peterson should present all the facts and stop trying to alarm us needlessly. By the way, is he a Democrat?



2. PETERSON IS THE SAME MAN WHO WANTS RETIRED PEOPLE TO LIVE ON LESS. PETERSON HAPPENS TO BE A MEGA MILLIOMAIRE ELITEST WHO NEVER HAD TO SLOSH THROUGH THE TRENCHES LIKE MOST OF US LITTLE PEOPLE.INVEST THE PRICE OF THIS BOOK IN YOUR RETIREMENT FUND OR BUY GRANDMOTHER GROCERIES.



3. This book is chock-full of speciousnonsense,employingsuperficial and misleading use of statistics,worst-case scenarios, and outright horror stories more designed to frighten and divide different elements of the American electorate for crass conservative political purposes than it is an objective and useful text about the subject at hand. What neo-conservative apologist Mr. Pete Petersen and the think-tank (isn't that an absolute oxymoron?) he's associated with doesn't want you to know is that our heroes in the U.S. Congress have been systematically frittering away the 'surplus' money all we aging soon-to-be-seniors have been contributing since the late 1960s in order to hide their own profligate and irresponsible spending agendas like STAR WARS and the new missile defense system that can't tell a warhead from a drone. Hey, guys! Have a bake-sale instead.

   In essence, the only reason social security is potentially underfunded in the long-term is because of their ( ), waste, and abuse. A small corrective action taken now by Congress can correct an imbalance. Yeah, I know, congressional action is another oxymoron, but a fellow has to have some hope. Hey! Why don't we curtail the Congress's retirement program instead? Not in this life. More seriously, Mr Petersen uses the worst possible case scenario to build his case, assuming all seniors will stop working, that the economy will not contiue to grow, and ignoring the fact that all the money given to seniors by way of social security and medicare go back into the economy and is not "lost" at all, any more than money spent on defense or agriculture by the Congress is lost. Only in Mr. Petersen's neighborhood.

   The bottom line in all this is that there are obviously a number of much better, clearer, and smarter books that make much more sense about the prospects associated with the aging babyboomer population as well as covering the welter of issues associated with the long-term social, economic, and political impacts one can reasonably associate with a gradually aging population. Try "America The Wise" by Theodore Roszak out instead, and consign this gloomy, silly, superficial and self-serving piece of neo-conservative political ( ) for the dustbin of history, where it rightly belongs. END




4. This isn't an exceptionally good book for a number of reasons that aren't really being euclidated in the other reviews.

   First, whoever reads this obviously has to realize that the author was a partner at an investment bank AND leans conservatively. These two points DO give liberals reason to question where his heart lies; to discount the whole of the book for that reason hints that readers aren't being open minded and fair. And before you write this review off as bad, note that I gave it two stars too....

   Peterson tries in this book to make a point-- that due to what in techincal terms are called Phase-III demographic shifts (i.e. birth rate falls, death rate falls, a higher percentage of the population reaches the retirement age...) the means of entitlement that have become traditional don't work as simply any more. In his other book ('The greying...') he makes the case for the United States; in this one he focuses on Western Europe.

   His evidence as presented is valid. There is no lock-box; paying for my retirement (I'm 22 right now...) with the wages of my children will be impossible without significant structural changes in the system. (Personally, I think that paying for it with the stock market is pretty bad karma too.... but that's neither here nor there for this review....) European countries and Japan are due to be hit doubly hard because of their traditionally-greater entitlements and the specifics of their demographies.... most economists would agree on these points....

   And his solutions are good-- given that people have the ability to save (assuming that people reliant on Social Security do.... not other rich people... like the author...) and that people are willing to work. His solutions aren't biased so much by his position excepting the possibility that he may not realize that for lots of people, saving is an impossibility.... working longer in years is more or less a definate....

   But these aren't really earth-shattering ideas. Adding to this, I find his writing style annoying. More so than this, I find reviewers who have slammed this book as being bad just based on it being written by an I.Banker annoying.

   Think! And.... by a book on this pheonomenon by a better economist.... who doesn't try to dumb down the information....




5. Pete Peterson has written several books on the looming bankruptcy of the Social Security system. In this book, he covers the G-7 nations, which are in worse shape than the United States is.

   On page 72, he makes a point that I should have seen sometime over the last 41 years, when I first began looking into this problem. An unfunded liability must be amortized, just like a home mortgage. As of 1999, the unfunded liability of Social Secutrity was $10 trillion. The unfunded liability of Medicare was also $10 trillion. The yearly amortization payment that the U.S. government must set aside each year to fund these two programs over the next 30 years at 6% interest is $1.4 trillion per year. You can verify this on any amortization calculator on the Web. Just take off 9 zeroes when you enter 20,000, and stick them back on when you derive the yearly amortization figure.

   The estimated U.S. government budget for fiscal 2000 is $2 trillion. This means that, in order to fund these two off-budget programs, the government must spend 75% of its budget.

   Peterson might also have made this point: If (if!!!!) the government does not do this, then this year's $1.4 trillion shortfall must be added to the total unfunded liability. And if the government refuses to fund next year's amortization schedule, it will add another $1.5 trillion. And so on, until.... "Sorry, gramps: no more payments to you." I'm age 58. That's me.

   The Federal Reserve System will create the money, thereby creating mass inflation, or else Congress will move up the retirement age, year by year, stiffing the geezers. The government-guaranteed retirement myth will end.

   The book shows that Japan will hit the actuarial brick wall in 2003. Italy will hit it in 2005. The G-7 dominoes will topple.

   This is a great book. When the chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations says a crisis is looming, you had better believe it.

5 comments about The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation.

1. Karel van Wolferen's The Enigma of Japanese Power presents to us a picture of the Japanese government as a corrupt and manipulative "System" in which individuals have few rights and are often ignored. What distinguishes this book from others in the area is the explanation given for how this came to be. Whereas Ruth Benedict and Chie Nakane use cultural and structural approaches to Japanese society, respectively, Van Wolferen views it from a political perspective. This allows The Enigma and Japanese Power to remain relevant even after the "bubble burst" of the Japanese economy.
   One of Van Wolferen's central topics in this book is that not everything is as it appears in Japan - certainly not a new idea to the field. However, the political viewpoint he takes is refreshing. For example, he claims that there are two "Confusing Factors" (5) about Japan that cause problems when dealing with other countries. The first fiction is that Japan has a responsible central government. Note the word "responsible," since Japan clearly has a central government. Instead of a transparent government in which people are responsible for their decisions, Van Wolferen tells us that there is no one individual or group that has complete control over the country. Rather, power is divided among many ministries, politicians, and bureaucrats. At the start of the second chapter he tells us that, of course Japan has laws and regulations, several political parties, and unions workers can join. However, he then also explains that just because these institutions exist with our Western names attached to them does not mean they function in the same manner.
   For example, Van Wolferen describes politics in Japan as a "rigged one party system" (28), even though there are quite a few opposition parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is neither liberal nor democratic, is primarily "a vote-getting machine" (30) and a policy-oriented organization dead last. Through gerrymandering the voting districts to favor rural areas - where the LDP has always had strong support -, buying votes, and pork-barrel politics (making promises to help a city by funneling money to it if a certain politician is elected for the area) the LDP has managed to virtually monopolize seats in the Diet. Due to this tremendous amount of power, policy debates and outcries against LDP corruption "are performances that are democratically reassuring but with not the slightest influence on developments in the countries affairs" (30). Due to this overwhelming power, the people are virtually at the LDP's mercy.
   The other fiction about Japan that Van Wolferen thinks causes problems is that Japan has a free-market economy. He quotes Chalmers Johnson in describing Japan and other Asian countries as "capitalist developmental states" (6). In this system the economy of a country depends on a good relationship between industry and bureaucrats. In other words, the industry "advises" the bureaucracy about what they should do and the bureaucrats make policies that reflect those "suggestions." For example, Van Wolferen points out the banning of oral contraceptives in order to "[prevent] any decline in the lucrative abortion industry" (53) as an example of this. The incentives for bureaucrats are top positions in big business after retirement (known in Japan as amakudari - descent from heaven).
   Van Wolferen argues that the ability to say or present one thing and take a completely different course of action - and that no one seems to care - is due to a lack of any universal truths or beliefs held by the Japanese. He says that because the political elites were able to pick and choose what aspects of Buddhism and Confucianism were adopted by society, they were able to weed out anything that detracted from their power. In this way, religion came to be a tool the government used to project an image that those in power were beyond the law, yet were still benevolent rulers. However, in Western thought, the government is seen as a protector of the people, answerable to the same laws as the commoners. In other words, Van Wolferen states that the lack of "truths, rules principals or morals that always apply, no matter what the circumstances" (9) enables the Japanese to accept seemingly hypocritical viewpoints and stances without flinching.
   I enjoyed reading The Enigma of Japanese Power. It is popular Nihonjinron at its peak - easily accessible, entertaining, and does not stray too far from the generally held views of Japan. Some would argue that this third fact detracts from the book, but I do not agree. By looking at Japan through a political viewpoint, rather than a cultural one like countless others, Van Wolferen is able to garner more validity. Reducing everything done differently in Japan to culture or tradition gets us nowhere. Instead, by looking at the situation differently we can see that there are specific reasons why the Japanese are they way they are. It is important to realize, however, that this political view has its limitations as well, which I believe Van Wolferen makes clear that he knows.



2. Published just as the infamous Japanese 'bubble' economy was set to burst - and from which, more than ten years down the road, Japan has yet to recover - van Wolferen's work remains a classic in the field. The Dutch journalist spent more than thirty years reporting from Japan. Though the tenor of Japan's relationship with the outside world has changed considerably in the intervening years, much of what van Wolferen noted remains true.
   Following publication, van Wolferen's speaking engagements dried up or were suddenly canceled, and he was tagged with the 'Japan basher' moniker. More than anything, van Wolferen had broken the taboo of uttering what all knew to be, on various levels, the truth about how Japan's political and bureaucratic culture functions.
   In places the book is dense. The general reader can skip to relevant sections. They include pieces on education, the elusive Japanese state, the all-pervasive bureaucracy, the middle class, ritual in society, intimidation, the press, and others. Very persuasive.



3. Journalist Karel van Wolferen makes a compelling case for the argument that there is virtually no one in control of the Japanese state: it's ruling elite consists of administrators who jockey for position as they seek advantage for their respective ministries, thereby making it difficult for Japan to speak with a unified voice on the international front or make commitments to foreign governments on which it can follow through. Detractors unfairly stain van Wolferen's name with the epithet "Japan-basher," but it was clear to me that he felt a great deal of empathy for the average Japanese, who he says also suffers under the system he describes.
   
   The most refreshing aspect of this book is that it avoids that tired cliche of Japan writing: the portrait of the Japanese as purely the unique product of a unique culture, as if they were a charming and polite race not entirely of this world. Get to know them personally and you find that we have far more in common than not. Power corrupts in Japan, just as it does everywhere else. People have a tendency to value the status quo and defend their own interests in Japan, just as they do everywhere else. It is not difficult to believe that in Japan, a country that has always been hierarchically organized and has had the dubious benefit of being isolated from the outside world for much of its history, the elite at the top of that hierarchicy would exercise their power to protect the state of affairs that sustains them, however short-sighted a policy that might ultimately prove to be.
   
   Van Wolferen's book deserves serious consideration, not to be dismissed as the diatribe of a racist.



4. Van Wolferen does an excellent job of exploring the basis of power in Japanese society. As you read the book, you'll learn that Japanese power is a very collective and amorphous thing. There is no one person or one group in charge of everything. There is no strong political leader, such as America has in its president. Power flows almost like water.
   
   Another interesting thing that Van Wolferen covers in his book is that the way that Japanese people are today is not due to culture. The Japanese character has been molded by political decisions made in the past. It's interesting to see how he comes at this idea. Read the book and check it out for yourself.



5. Some of you may remember that old television program "The Outer Limits", where an announcer said at the beginning of the show, "We now have control of your television set", and then at the end, the announcer returned control of your television set to you.
   
   I have never been to Japan, but I have belonged to a Japan-based religious organization for some time. This book was a wonderful returning of my television set to me. Whatever complaints others may have, it was just what I need to read to realize that no, there wasn't anything wrong with me - I'm an American and that's OK.
   
   Issues like the intense level of group loyalty, leader loyalty, fierce in-fighting and factionalism, putting a "happy face" on conflict in the hope that a show of unity will make the problem "go away", an intense concern with glossy public relations publications, how control and power are exercised, and how "who's in charge" is always kept a secret. All of this became much more clear to me, and has allowed me to have a lot more insight into my associations.
   
   The book itself focuses on Japan's political and economic structures - not something I have a lot of exposure to, but the insights definitely "cross over" into other Japan-based organizations.
   
   If I could give it more than five stars, I would.

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